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ABSTRACT 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the desire of Americans to feel 
secure made ethnic and religious profiling a tempting security trade-off.  Generalizations 
about Arabs and Muslims as terrorists seemed to lead to an increasing practice of singling 
out individuals who look Arab or appear to be Muslim in entry-exit systems and in 
counterterrorist investigations.  Civil liberties and Muslim advocacy groups immediately 
cried foul as accusations of profiling began to surface in the media and various 
government reports.  Today, the main emphasis of the debate continues to focus on civil 
liberties.  The aim of this thesis is to take a fresh perspective on profiling in 
counterterrorist-operations and demonstrate that profiling is actually counterproductive to 
an effective long-term counterterrorism strategy.  This thesis first highlights major 
findings on the usefulness of racial profiling in criminal policing.  It then examines issues 
of ethnic identity and the grand strategy of Islamic terrorist organizations and illustrates 
the counterproductive nature of ethnic and religious profiling.  It will also demonstrate 
that while complaints of ethnic profiling persist within the Muslim community, the 
technique does not appear to have played a role in the disruption of actual terrorist plots 
in the United States. 
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 1
I. RACIAL, ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS PROFILING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Ethnic profiling of Arabs and religious profiling of Muslims in the United States 
is often advocated as part of a counterterrorist (CT) strategy and anti-terrorist tool.  Its 
use is contentious and provocative for a number of historical and legal reasons.  Coupled 
with the uncertainty surrounding future terrorist attacks, the constant reminder of the 
potential for death and destruction on American soil by both the media and politicians 
marginalized civil liberties and replaced the void with measures for increasing security 
procedures, primarily though enhanced anti-terrorism measures.  This security 
perspective re-ignited a debate that had seemed to dissipate in American public discourse 
since the heated debates on the racial profiling of African Americans that existed in the 
late 1990s.   
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), the desire of Americans 
to feel secure made ethnic and religious profiling a tempting security trade-off.  Shortly 
after the 9/11 attacks, generalizations about Arabs and Muslims as terrorists seemed to 
lead to an increasing practice of singling out individuals who look Arab or appear to be 
Muslim in entry-exit systems and in counterterrorist investigations.  Civil liberties groups 
and members of councils on Arab relations immediately cried foul, as accusations of 
ethnic and religious profiling began to surface in the media and various government 
reports.  Today, the main emphasis of the debate continues to revolve around the legality 
and morality of ethnic and religious profiling.  For reasons unknown, however, what 
continues to get overlooked is whether profiling even works.   
The main goal of this thesis is to attempt to determine the utility or disutility of 
racial profiling in criminal policing, including terrorism.  The findings outlined in 
subsequent chapters will attempt to demonstrate that ethnic profiling of Arabs and 
religious profiling of Muslims may not provide benefits that are greater than the costs of 
using profiling as part of an overall counterterrorism strategy. 
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A. IMPORTANCE: TAKING SIDES ON PROFILING 
Ethnic profiling of Arabs, and religious profiling of Muslims, in the United States 
is often advocated as part of a counterterrorist strategy and anti-terrorist tool.  The 
practice of singling out individuals who look Arab or appear to be Muslim in entry-exit 
systems sparked a heated debate.  The use of profiling is contentious and provocative for 
a number of historical and legal reasons.  More so, support for profiling is often tied to 
feelings about Muslims.  John Esposito noted in a 2007 comprehensive Gallup World 
Poll that 44 % of Americans say Muslims are too extreme in their religious beliefs, while 
fewer than half of Americans believe that U.S. Muslims are loyal to the United States; 
and nearly one-quarter of Americans surveyed do not even want a Muslim as a neighbor.1   
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 created an increased sense of fear and anxiety in 
American public discourse.  Coupled with the uncertainty surrounding future terrorist 
attacks of any magnitude, the constant reminder of the potential for death and destruction 
on American soil by both the media and politicians marginalized civil liberties and 
replaced the void with measures for increasing security procedures, primarily though 
enhanced anti-terrorism measures.  This security perspective and emphasis on Arabs and 
Muslims is clearly defended by advocates for profiling, for example: 
Of the nineteen hijackers responsible for [the 9/11] calamity, all were 
Arabic, all were practitioners of Islam, and all came from known state 
incubators of terrorism in the Middle East.  Of the twenty-two suspects on 
the FBI’s ‘most wanted’ list of international terrorists, all are Arabic, all 
are practitioners of Islam, and all come from known state incubators of 
terrorism in the Middle East.  Not ‘some’ of them, or a ‘disproportionate 
number’ of them.  All of them.2 
 
 
                                                 
1 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think 
(New York, N.Y: Gallup Press, 2007), 155. 
2 Jason L. Riley, “Racial Profiling and Terrorism,” October 24, 2001, 
http://www.facstaff.bucknell.edu/pagana/mg312/racialprofiling.html, quoted in Harvey W. Kushner and 
Bart Davis, Holy War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror Network in the United States (New 
York: Sentinel, 2004), 122. 
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This statement serves as a summation of the extent to which generalizing Arabs and 
Muslims as possible terrorists after 9/11 evolved and speaks volumes for the assumptions 
behind the justification of using profiling as a tool for law enforcement officers and 
security agents to prevent future attacks. 
The assumptions behind racial profiling constitute the same assumptions that are 
used in ethnic and religious profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the context of 
counterterrorism.  A 2002 report published by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 
Education Fund, a civil rights coalition that has engaged in national civil rights lobbying 
efforts since 1957,3 summarizes the basic assumptions fueling profiling in 
counterterrorism policing: 
[S]tate and local law enforcement officers are clearly acting on the basis of 
assumptions about the propensity of certain racial, ethnic and religious 
groups to engage in terrorism—in the same way they have long assumed 
African American or Hispanic involvement in drug crimes and 
immigration violations—and in the process are stopping, searching, and 
arresting many innocent people.4 
Arguably, 9/11 exacerbated the assumptions driving the justification for profiling 
Arabs and Muslims at airports, office buildings, border entry checkpoints, sporting 
events, and other venues of security interest. 
Historically, there is a long controversy surrounding the use of racial profiling in 
criminal investigations.  The literature points to several examples of such use.  The 
historical examples, however, are absent of any analysis that uses measures of success in 
an attempt to demonstrate whether or not profiling works in criminal policing.  One such 
example dates back to the late 1980s and lasted through the 1990s, where state police in 
Maryland profiled African Americans on Interstate 95 (I-95) in an attempt to apprehend 
drug couriers.5   Newspaper reports and journal articles covering this time period indicate 
                                                 
3 “About LCCR & LCCREF,” on the Civilrights.org Web site, available at 
http://www.civilrights.org/about/ (accessed May 2, 2009). 
4 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund (LCCREF), Wrong then, Wrong Now: Racial 
Profiling before and After September 11, 2001 (2001), 
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racial_profiling/racial_profiling_report.pdf. 
5 Lauri S. Friedman, Are Efforts to Reduce Terrorism Successful? (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 
2005), 74. 
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that fewer than 20 % of all drivers on I-95 were black, though about 70 % of all vehicles 
stopped and searched contained black occupants; sometimes the vehicles were 
completely dismantled after turning up no evidence.6  The literature is completely 
permeated with historical examples of racial profiling in criminal policing.  All of the 
literature seems to gravitate toward arguing that profiling is morally wrong and obstructs 
civil liberties, while glancing over measures of effectiveness. 
There are two sides in the profiling debate: one side advocates profiling, the other 
argues against profiling.  Those who advocate profiling do so on the basis of observations 
that terrorists tend to be Arab and Muslim.  From this, they maintain that focusing on this 
group of people is an efficient and effective way of policing.  Others, however, argue that 
targeting people who look like Mohammed Atta and the other 9/11 hijackers is far too 
inclusive.7  Critics of profiling argue that predictive profiles based on race, ethnicity, or 
religion draw too much attention away from observations of behaviors.  Moreover, critics 
often point to lack of evidence to support a visible reduction in both crime and terrorism 
as a result of profiling.  Instead, critics of profiling argue that observing behaviors could 
illuminate more critical leads in counterterrorism policing.  
There is also a strong base of support advocating the use of profiling in 
counterterrorist policing.  Harvey Kushner argues in favor of ethnic and religious 
profiling.  He states that Arab terrorist networks have operated in the United States as 
early as the mid-1980s, with the most prominent documented case of a close-knit network 
originating out of North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in 
Greensboro.8  The individuals in what was then perceived as a religious/social/cultural 
network at the North Carolina A&T each became the subjects of intense scrutiny and 
federal investigation for terrorism related offenses.  All were Arabs; all were Muslims. 
Richard Lowry, a contributor to the National Review and author of Legacy: 
Paying the Price for the Clinton Years, argues that racial profiling reduces terrorism.  He 
                                                 
6 Friedman, Are Efforts to Reduce Terrorism Successful? 74. 
7 Ibid., 75. 
8 Kushner and Davis, Holy War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror Network in the United 
States, 1. 
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states, “Islamic terrorists will necessarily be Muslim, and probably from the Arab world.  
Not to profile for those characteristics is simply to ignore the nature of today’s 
terrorism.”9  Not only does Lowry argue that profiling is not discrimination, but he 
declares that the extra burden on young male Arab-Americans and Arab immigrants is an 
acceptable social cost given the stakes involved in preventing another attack.10  His 
argument is commonplace for those who advocate profiling in the debate on whether or 
not profiling is an effective tool in reducing terrorism.   However, neither Kushner nor 
Lowry present indicators that equate to measures of success, an integral part of 
determining the usefulness of profiling. 
Another school of thought criticizes the use of profiling against Arabs and 
Muslims by asserting that profiling is only used because of society’s reaction to the 
perceived threat by Muslims.  By generalizing the correlation between terrorists and 
Arab-Muslims, the entire population of those groups is perceived as potential terrorists, 
thereby demonizing them as suspects intent on committing terrorism.  Summarily, an 
entire culture is perceived as a threat.  The threat, in turn, manifests itself into the bedrock 
of a society’s norms and belief system, effecting dramatic alterations in what society is 
willing to both advocate and tolerate to preserve its own security.  Jane Mayer articulates 
this argument in her work, The Dark Side.  She posits that the threat of future terrorist 
attacks caused a fundamental shift in U.S. societal discourse that led to the sort of evil 
dynamics personified in the conduct of torture in prisons.11  The assumptions behind 
Mayer’s argument demonstrate that in perceiving Arab-Muslims as a threat and hotbed of 
potential terrorists, there is a subsequent shift in what society is willing to advocate in 
preserving its security. 
There is another side to profiling that does not seem to be mentioned in the 
literature pertaining to profiling.  This alternative side suggests that profiling is likely 
counter-productive to an effective strategy towards preventing terrorism. Essentially, 
                                                 
9 Friedman, Are Efforts to Reduce Terrorism Successful? 65. 
10 Ibid., 67–69. 
11 Jane Mayer, Dark Side: The Inside Story of how the War on Terror Turned into a War on American 
Ideals (New York: Doubleday, 2008), xx. 
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profiling could have greater long-term ramifications than what civil-liberty advocates are 
currently arguing, and what security advocates seem to have failed to address.  Some 
scholars warn of the potential for the “European effect” to take hold in the United States.  
Some estimates state, “between 15 and 20 million Muslims now call Europe home and 
make up four to five % of its total population.”12  One scholar argues that Europe is 
experiencing a rapid emergence of homegrown terrorism.13  One position is that a 
possible causal factor of the homegrown terrorism is that Arabs and Muslims do not feel 
European.  Hate and discontent are passed from one generation to another, worsening 
with each passing generation, and the end result is a massive population living in Europe 
and hating Europeans.14  This could be due, in large part, to the claim that most European 
nations “never learned to integrate newcomers.”15  The result is that Europe really has 
more of an “internal colony”—referring to Europe’s Muslims—as opposed to an 
integrated society.16   
These points are important because they highlight the role of issues such as 
identity, and assimilation and integration, as ingredients to radicalization in the Muslim 
diaspora.  These issues play an important role in determining whether profiling Muslims 
in CT-operations is effective.  Has the United States, by-and-large, avoided this problem 
because of the inclusive nature of civil rights, or because much of the U.S. was built on 
immigration?17  That question, alone, is not the primary scope of this thesis.  The 
question, however, is important when it comes to the arbitrary use of profiling Muslims 
in CT-operations.  I will attempt to demonstrate that profiling may actually reject the  
                                                 
12 Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 84, no.4 (July-August 2005), 120–
135, 122. 
13 Ibid., 121. 
14 Leiken calls second and third-generation Muslims in Europe the most “dangerous incarnation.”  See 
Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” 127. 
15 Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” 122. 
16 Ibid., 123. 
17 Leiken asserts that the Muslim immigration problem that Europe is dealing with is different because 
Muslims entering the U.S. were entering a country already established on immigration, where as the 
Muslims entering Europe after WWII “crowded into small, culturally homogenous nations…a new 
phenomenon for many host states [in Europe] and generally unwelcome.” See Leiken, “Europe’s Angry 
Muslims,” 122. 
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assertion that the U.S. is doing a better job of integration, primarily because the use of 
profiling fosters resentment, which could lead to future generations of Muslims living in 
America and hating Americans. 
The idea that Muslims pose a threat is also prevalent in another area of literature, 
suggesting that profiling fuels tensions between non-Muslims and Arab-Muslims living 
in the United States and exacerbates the “clash of civilizations” between Muslims and 
non-Muslims in the United States.18  A particular notion of anxiety is felt in the Muslim 
world in the manner it frames the West, just as a notion of anxiety is felt by the West in 
the manner it frames Muslims, Islamism, and extremism.  This anxiety translates into a 
feeling of being threatened by the other, and transcends into the idea that there exists 
some kind of existential struggle between the West and the Muslim world.  “In effect, the 
West holds distinctly Islamic culture responsible for an existential threat [of violence 
perpetrated by jihad].”19  Domestic ethnic relations within the U.S. function as a 
microcosm for the clash between the West and the Muslim world that Amit Pandya 
suggests is occurring on the global scale.  These perspectives fuel arguments for profiling 
on the basis that it is this group of people who are engaged in criminal acts and threaten 
U.S. society. 
In sum, though there are two very clear sides to the debate on profiling, the survey 
of the literature has identified no literature that argues whether or not racial or ethnic 
profiling, including its use in counterterrorism policing, even works by using measures of 
success as indicators.  The literature indicates that there is a strong emphasis being placed 
on debating whether profiling should or should not be used by arguing that it is a security 
necessity, or arguing that it is blatant discrimination, or that it is a fundamental invasion 
of an individual’s constitutional rights.  However, there is practically no emphasis on 
whether or not racial or ethnic profiling even works.  This thesis aims to address that gap 
                                                 
18 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1st 
Touchstone ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997). 
19 Amit Pandya, Islam and Politics: Renewal and Resistance in the Muslim World, Regional Voices: 
Transnational Challenges project, (2009), available at 
http://www.stimson.org/rvproto/partner.cfm?SN=RV200902021933 (accessed May 12, 2009). 
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and determine the measures of success that indicate the extent that profiling aids CT-
operations, and on a broader dimension, is an effective technique in law enforcement. 
B. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY 
This thesis examines the use of racial profiling in law enforcement and CT- 
operations, and it argues that such profiling can be counterproductive when relied on too 
heavily.  This argument will be made first by examining a well-known case of the use of 
such techniques by police.  This example is cited as demonstrating how profiling can be 
effective, but it will show that the social costs of using race as a sole indicator in policing 
tactics will yield extremely high social costs, outweighing the benefits of such a 
technique.  Next, this thesis will highlight that following September 11, 2001, law 
enforcement officers might have relied too heavily on backgrounds such as ethnicity and 
religion, specifically Arabs and Muslims, in conducting CT-operations.  It will 
accomplish this through a survey of the literature and through brief excerpts from 
experiences of Muslims and Arabs living in America who claim they were victims of 
profiling.  I will show that this resulted in marginalizing the Arab and Muslim 
community in the United States, and increased the sense of distrust of law enforcement, 
ultimately yielding the same high social costs as what appeared to have resulted in the 
Maryland racial profiling case. 
The thesis will then examine several cases of foiled terrorist plots, to see what 
factors appear to have led authorities to be able to stop the plots—and it will show that 
racial profiling does not seem to have been involved.  Nevertheless, the perception by the 
Muslim and Arab community in the United States that they are being targeted by law 
enforcement officers conducting CT-operations continues to persist.  While it appears law 
enforcement officers agree that, to some degree, race and ethnicity will always play a role 
in their policing tactics, the questions remains as to where the line gets crossed when race 
and ethnicity are relied on too heavily.  As such, the final chapter of this thesis will 
attempt to capture where that threshold might rest, and try to determine the extent that 
profiling becomes counterproductive. 
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1. The Challenge of Case Selection in Racial Profiling 
Historically, there is a long controversy surrounding the use of racial profiling in 
criminal policing.  Case selection of incidents of racial profiling in law enforcement is 
difficult because most historical examples of racial profiling are absent of sufficient data 
to describe the events in question.  In most allegations of racial profiling, statistical 
disparities are used to illustrate a disproportionate number of police transactions (e.g., 
traffic stops, searches or arrests) on minority groups.  However, statistical disparities 
often times lack in-depth analysis and thus increase the propensity to make insufficient 
generalizations about alleged police racial profiling tactics.  This makes the task of 
identifying measures of success difficult.  
One example that sufficiently analyzes racial profiling in law enforcement is a 
case that dates back to a series of incidents from the late 1980s to late 1990s.   In this 
case, state police in Maryland profiled African Americans on Interstate 95 in an attempt 
to apprehend drug couriers.20  The Interstate-95 racial profiling case in Maryland is one 
of the most thoroughly examined cases of racial profiling.  Because this case has 
undergone extensive analysis, it will help in extracting measures of success for the 
purpose of this paper. 
C. RACIAL PROFILING DEFINED 
Racial profiling is a concept that has vast implications in the field of criminal 
policing.  While there is no universally accepted definition of racial profiling, there is 
sufficient precedent of its use that scholars can identify and analyze its use in specific 
contexts.  Most of the serious analyses on racial profiling agree on a description that is, 




                                                 
20 Lauri S. Friedman, Are Efforts to Reduce Terrorism Successful? (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 
2005), 74. 
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Racial profiling occurs when a law enforcement officer questions, stops, 
arrests, searches or otherwise investigates a person because the officer 
believes that members of that person’s racial or ethnic group are more 
likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is 
investigating.21   
This description of racial profiling demonstrates that racial profiling is essentially a 
conscious judgment call by a law enforcement officer.  The officer bases his decision on 
a judgment that an individual is part of a particular group that is more prone to crime than 
individuals of other racial or ethnic groups.22 
When is it not racial profiling?  Most of the academic, jurisprudence, and policy 
perspectives of racial profiling do not consider allegations of racial profiling appropriate 
when an investigation is underway and law enforcement officers are looking for a 
particular person who might fit a specific physical description.  One example is when law 
enforcement is searching for a person of interest or suspect fitting a specific profile, i.e., 
the victim was last seen with an unknown Hispanic male, approximately 6 feet tall, tattoo 
on the left forearm, etc., etc.  On the contrary, racial profiling is often tagged as 
discriminatory and raises complaints when law enforcement officers target a particular 
race or ethnic group in search of crimes that have not yet been reported or committed.23 
D. CONCLUSION 
In the next chapter, this thesis will highlight several findings that function as 
measures of success for racial profiling as a law enforcement technique.  Much of the 
emphasis in the findings will be placed on the unintended consequences of relying too 
heavily on race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation in criminal policing, to include CT-
operations.  Later chapters will highlight that ethnic and religious profiling of Arabs and 
Muslims living in the United States also creates unintended consequences, much like a 
                                                 
21 Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes, “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on 
the Highway," Michigan Law Review 101, no. 3 (December 2002), 654. 
22 Gross and Barnes, “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,” 655. 
23 Ibid., 655.  
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“Catch-22” effect?24  The preliminary findings will suggest that the benefits of ethnic and 
religious profiling are trumped by the social costs and consequences of its use.  More 
specifically, the ethnic and religious profiling of Arabs and Muslims as part of a 
counterterrorist policing strategy reinforces the negative image of both law enforcement 
and Americans in general, as perceived by the global Muslim community.   
In the context of terrorism, these unintended consequences might lead to 
situations that are worse than simply degraded community relations.  Consider one 
hypothesis in the context of counterterrorism strategy: Overwhelming military force 
reinforces the terrorists’ target of aggression to be an evil enemy and thus enhances their 
status and promotes an increase of recruits to their cause.25  Ethnic and religious profiling 
of Arabs and Muslims, too, may increase legitimacy within the Arab-Muslim community 
of a violent terrorist campaign.  Thus, the use of ethnic and religious profiling may in fact 
provide radical social networks an additional selling point in their efforts to recruit 
individuals that are susceptible to their propaganda. 
Finally, understanding that the social consequences of profiling can be extremely 
high, a serious examination of the utility or disutility of profiling must consider the fact 
that race, ethnicity, and religion will most likely always play a role in law enforcement’s 
efforts to prevent or reduce crime, including terrorism.  The question that must be asked 
is: to what degree is race, ethnicity, or religion a factor in preventing crime?  This, too, 
will be addressed in this thesis.  I will attempt to capture the threshold that appears to 
exist in the use of profiling as a policing technique.  This effort is important in illustrating 
where the line gets crossed in relying too heavily on race, ethnicity, or religion as 
indicators in preventing crime. 
                                                 
24 The idea of the Catch-22 effect was derived from a hypothesis that is shared by prominent scholars 
of terrorism such as Andrew Silke and Martha Crenshaw, who refer to the idea of a Catch-22 effect when 
discussing the use of overwhelming force against the terrorist infrastructure.  
25 Andrew Silke, Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its 
Consequences (Chichester, West Sussex, England; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003), 267.  While profiling is a 
more passive counterterrorism tactic than massive military strikes, the Catch-22 reference is an appropriate 
phrase that conveys the dilemma created by profiling Arabs and Muslims in counterterrorist policing.   
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II. CASE STUDY OF RACIAL PROFILING: MARYLAND’S 
INTERSTATE-95 CORRIDOR 
Many analyses of racial profiling concentrate on using disparate data to prove that 
police officers are making a subconscious judgment call that a person might be suspect of 
a crime, or engaged in a crime, because of the color of his or her skin.  The same analyses 
are now being cited by civil liberties groups as precedent to demonstrate that officers are 
now profiling Muslims using the same assumptions that were used in the often-cited 
cases of “driving while black” or “driving while brown.”  One lawsuit by several 
Muslims even used the same provocative language to push civil actions against the airline 
industry, calling their suit “flying while Muslim.”26  It is important to examine such 
analyses and determine what other findings can be extracted, as such an examination 
might help to provide useful insight into whether or not the technique was in any way 
successful. 
In this chapter, I highlight several findings that function as measures of success 
for racial profiling as a law enforcement technique.  I do this by first examining a well-
known case of the use of such a technique by police on the Interstate-95 corridor in 
Maryland.  I then weigh the findings against the social costs of such a technique to 
illustrate the unintended consequences of relying too heavily on race in preventing crime.  
This contributes to my thesis by demonstrating that the benefits of ethnic and religious 
profiling are trumped by the social costs and consequences of its use.  The findings of 
this case study highlight that the use of ethnic and religious profiling of Arabs and 
Muslims as part of a counterterrorist policing strategy reinforces the negative image of 
both law enforcement and non-Muslim Americans in general, as perceived by the global 
Muslim community, and is likely counterproductive to an effective long-term CT-
strategy. 
 
                                                 
26 The original phrase of “flying While Muslim” comes from a lawsuit filed by six Muslim Imams that 
claim their constitutional rights and civil liberties were violated when U.S. Airways removed them from the 
flight before take-off and security agents questioned them.  The Council of American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR) created a Web site dedicated to the case, available at http://www.flyingwhilemuslim.org.  See also 
Shqeirat et al. v. U.S. Airways Group, et al. 
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To discover whether or not profiling works in CT-operations, I conducted a case 
study of racial profiling in law enforcement to determine if it was effective in preventing 
crime.  There are four major findings that will be presented in the case study:   
(1) Greater quantities of drugs, if not most, were found in just a handful of 
searches on black motorists, indicating that the targeting of black 
motorists on I-95 was successful in finding drug dealers. 
(2) While the Maryland State Police (MSP) has defended its practices under 
the argument that their tactics have led to the arrest of a handful of dealers, 
a very high number of black motorists were targeted, whether intentionally 
or unintentionally, to yield those results.  The resulting social 
consequences of the perceived targeting of black motorists were extremely 
high, exacerbating racial tensions and provoking lasting negative impacts 
on law enforcement-community relations. 
(3) There is no evidence to support or deny the claim that if MSP had pulled 
over and searched the same number of white motorists, that they would 
not have found a large amount of drugs or a handful of drug dealers. 
(4) Race is not a good indicator, when relied on too heavily, in preventing 
crime as black and white motorists are practically equal in hit rates: That 
is, they are just as likely to be found with some drugs. 
These findings provide useful insight into determining whether ethnic profiling of 
Muslims can have any impact in preventing terrorism.   
A. A DEADLY DRUG PROBLEM IN MARYLAND 
Situated on the East Coast of the United States, the Interstate 95 (I-95) corridor is 
much more than a long stretch of highway.  Spanning from Florida to Maine, I-95 is over 
1,900 miles long with connections to over 40,000 miles of the nation’s highway system.27   
The I-95 corridor provides access to 46 major seaports and 103 commercial airports, and 
its combined support of the nation’s economic infrastrucutre processes over 40 % of the 
                                                 
27 The I-95 Corridor “Fact Sheet,” on the I-95 Corridor Coalition Web site, available at 
http://www.i95coalition.org/i95/Home/I95CorridorFacts/tabid/173/Default.aspx (accessed May 31, 2009). 
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U.S. Gross Domestic Product.28  In Maryland, the I-95 corridor is the most heavily 
trafficked highway, and provides access to both the District of Columbia and Baltimore.  
The I-95 corridor in Maryland serves as the major conduit to the central and urban 
populations situated throughout the state.  It is not surprising, then, why this highway 
might be the perfect means for the vast distribution of illegal drugs throughout the state. 
From the mid-1980s to early-2000s, Maryland began experiencing an illegal drug 
problem that drastically multiplied in severity across all categories and ages in a short 
amount of time.  “In a 1994 survey in Maryland, for instance, 13 % of all eighth-graders 
reported that they had tried marijuana, nearly four times the 3.5 % who said they had 
used it in 1992.”29  This is only a fraction of the growing problem of illegal narcotics in 
Maryland. 
It quickly became clear that Maryland had an illegal drug problem that was 
worsening nearly every day.  In the 10-year period from the late 1980s to late 1990s, 
deaths resulting from drug overdose nearly tripled.30  The rising drug problem in the 
early 90s was not limited to the use of marijuana.  According to a 2002 report 
released by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA), amphetamine/methamphetamine emergency-room visits in Baltimore 
increased 500.5 %, between 1995 and 2002.31  Also in Baltimore, heroin and cocaine 
abuse surged.  Emergency room visits to Baltimore-area hospitals, as a result of 
heroin or cocaine overdose, increased from 3,056 to 10,579, with the largest heroin-
related increase in the nation and the second largest cocaine-related increase in the 
nation admitted to Baltimore area hospitals from 1990–1991.32  
                                                 
28 The I-95 Corridor “Fact Sheet,” on the I-95 Corridor Coalition Web site. 
29 Charles W. Hall, "Area Juveniles Feel the Tug of Illegal Drugs; Officials See a Surge among 
Younger Users," The Washington Post, June 23, 1996. 
30 United States. National Drug Intelligence Center. Maryland Drug Threat Assessment, Johnstown, 
PA: U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, 2002, 8. 
31 “Drug Abuse; Data show Increased Abuse of Methamphetamine in Midwest, East, South,” Medical 
Letter on the CDC & FDA (September 19, 2004), 32. 
32 Paul W. Valentine, “Drug Abuse ‘Epidemic’ Continues in Baltimore,” The Washington Post, 
February 3, 1993. 
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As the primary infrastructure used to bring illegal drugs into Maryland and to 
distribute them throughout its urban and rural parts, the I-95 corridor became one of 
many battlegrounds for law enforcement officers to target possession, distribution, and 
trafficking of illegal drugs.  The methods were viewed by the African American 
population as intentionally biased towards blacks.  The debate over racial disparities in 
drug enforcement, including stops, searches, seizures, and convictions, reached the 
highest levels of government.  The empirical evidence that is now available provides 
tools to measure the success of racial profiling in criminal policing, and examples of 
logical fallacies and pitfalls in using quantifiable indicators of success in determining the 
efficiency of racial and ethnic profiling. 
B. USING HIT RATES TO MEASURE DISPARATE DATA 
Perhaps the most common method of measuring success is based on a systematic 
and empirical method of identifying hit rates.  Hit rates are defined by the frequency of 
successful searches on the I-95 corridor.33  The time period under examination includes 
data obtained from MSP that spans the period 1995–2000.  First, quantifiable measures of 
success based on previous analyses will be illustrated and discussed.  Next, a qualitative 
cost-benefit analysis of the results will highlight the unintended consequences of racial 
and ethnic profiling. 
It is necessary to first explain the importance of hit rates as it pertains to this 
thesis.  As this analysis will soon demonstrate, it is not enough to argue that more drugs 
were found in vehicles driven by blacks than whites so, therefore, the targeting of black 
motorists was successful in drug interdiction.  Hit rates infer the likelihood of a sample of 
searches successfully finding drugs.  Oftentimes, related to the I-95 racial profiling case, 
statistical summaries will demonstrate disparities for the purpose of proving that racial 
profiling was used, and the results are illustrated in such a way that draws attention away 
from whether or not racial profiling works.  This case study demonstrates that racial 
profiling was occurring on I-95, but the use of hit rates highlight one of the most  
 
                                                 
33 Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes. “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on 
the Highway.” Michigan Law Review 101, no. 3, December 2002, 660. 
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important findings that pertain to this thesis: that race is not a good indicator for the 
potential of criminal activity, especially when it is relied on too heavily by law 
enforcement to prevent crime. 
C. HIT RATES AND MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
Empirical data reported by MSP for the period 1995–2000 actually appears to 
indicate that the targeting of black motorists on the I-95 corridor was a successful drug 
interdiction campaign.  In 1995, 70.4% of all searches were conducted on black motorists 
while only 20.4% of all searches were conducted on white motorists.34  Moreover, from 
1995 to 1996, black motorists were searched at an average rate of 13.9 times the rate that 
whites were searched.35  Though litigation against MSP might have led to an eventual even 
playing field in 1998 (see Figure 1), overall searches from 1997–2000 were conducted on 
average 5.2 times more often on black motorists than on whites.36  The results of all 
searches in the I-95 corridor spanning the entire period, listed by the proportions of drugs 
seized, are detailed in Table 1.  What is clear is that black motorists were not only searched 
more often, but they were yielding the seizure of the vast majority of drugs.  Does this 
mean that blacks are more likely to have drugs?  The answer is, “No.” 
 
Figure 1.   Time Trend of Searches on I-95 by Race37 
                                                 
34 Gross and Barnes, “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,” 716. 
35 Ibid., 720. 
36 Ibid., 666. 
37 Ibid., 716–720. 
 18
The numbers in Table 1 do not warrant the conclusion that blacks are more likely 
to have drugs.  In fact, there is an intervening variable that justifies the results in Table 1. 
 Marijuana Cocaine Crack Heroin 
White 0.9% 7.1% 1.8% 25.2% 
Black 96.2% 75.0% 96.7% 57.7% 
 
Table 1.   Proportions of the total amounts of drugs seized in the I-95 Corridor38 
It is not that black motorists are more likely to have drugs; it is that greater 
quantities of drugs were found in several particular instances of searches on black 
motorists.  In fact, the searches conducted by MSP on black motorists uncovered a larger 
number of medium-to-large dealers than were uncovered by searches on white 
motorists.39  In fact, during mid to late-1990s, although black motorists were searched 
anywhere from approximately 5 to 13 times more often, the white motorists who were 
searched were actually slightly more likely to be carrying some drugs.40  The difference 
can be explained by the data indicating that the black motorists who were searched were 
more than three-and-a-half times more likely to be small dealers and nearly five times 
more likely to be medium to large dealers.41  Drug dealers are classified as having large 
amounts of drugs in their possession.42  This means that the drugs seized from only a 
handful of black motorists were more than likely found in single instances in much larger 
quantities.  This refutes the conclusion that black motorists are more likely to have drugs.  
Instead, the sweeping searches conducted on many black motorists uncovered a single 
stash, of perhaps several different drugs, in much greater quantities, but in only a handful 
of searches. 
                                                 
38 Gross and Barnes, “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,” 705. 
39 For a complete description of what constitutes a dealer, see Appendix A, Table A-1. 
40 Gross and Barnes, “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,” 703. 
41 Ibid., 703. 
42 See Appendix A, Table A-2. 
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Another measure of success is found in the successful discovery of drug dealers.  
Assuming that the counterdrug efforts on I-95 did in fact include the technique of 
profiling black motorists, then the data available indicates that targeting of black 
motorists on I-95 was successful in finding drug dealers.  The fact that dealers are being 
successfully isolated has led MSP to defend its practices in recent years, especially with 
the search trends indicating that the proportional disparity was far less in 2000 than in 
1995.43  Nevertheless, it is not logical to stretch this measure of success and infer or 
conclude that black motorists were more likely to have drugs, which is arguably the 
rationale behind the tactic of racially profiling blacks on I-95. 
The frequency of successful searches, or hit rates, of both white and black 
motorists highlights another measure of success; however, this measure suggests that race 
is not a good indicator for preventing crime when relied on too heavily.  The resulting hit 
rate on the I-95 corridor demonstrates that 40.3% of the searches on white motorists and 
37.8% of the searches on black motorists turn-up drugs.44  The probability of a white 
motorist getting searched is 1 in 105 stops, while the probability of a black motorist 
getting searched is 1 in 36 stops.45  Thus, while a black motorist is about three times 
more likely to get searched than a white motorist, white motorists were slightly more 
likely to have some drugs.  This measure of success is more problematic to MSP’s 
attempt to defend its practices, as it suggests that had MSP pulled over white motorists at 
a similar rate than that of black motorists, it is entirely possible that the searches would 
have also resulted in the finding of a handful of medium-to-large dealers, just as they had 
in searches conducted on black motorists.  Without having the search rate to determine 
the resulting drug seizures, there will always remain that lingering doubt as to how the 
results might have differed.  Nevertheless, the measure of success that black and white 
motorists were just as likely to have some drugs in their possession suggests that race is 
not a good indicator for preventing crime, when relied on too heavily.   
                                                 
43 See Figure 1. See also Gross and Barnes, “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on 
the Highway,” 705–706. 
44 Gross and Barnes, “Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway,” 668. 
45 Ibid., 667. 
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The data presented here highlights that a quantifiable measure of success in racial 
profiling is found in the use of hit rates.  The data first appears to lead to the conclusion 
that racial profiling of black motorists on I-95 was a successful tool in Maryland’s drug 
interdiction campaign.  However, the data in fact indicates that racial profiling only 
yielded the seizures that it did because MSP was able to find a few dealers carrying large 
quantities of drugs.  However, a lot of black motorists had to be searched to yield this 
result.  As will be discussed later in this chapter, this created unexpected social costs that 
outweigh the long-term benefits of racial profiling methods. 
1. Additional Considerations in the I-95 Case 
The I-95 racial profiling case presupposes that race was the discriminating factor 
in making traffic stops, searches, and arrests in the attempt to quell the illegal distribution 
of drugs.  This assumption is used primarily to extract the measures of success.  The 
assumption does not stipulate that, in each case in which a black motorist was stopped, 
the officers making the stops made the conscious judgment call that the black motorists 
they were stopping were potential criminals because of the color of their skin.  There are 
many organizations exhausting all means available to find evidence that police officers 
were making such a conscious decision.  These efforts continue to prove fruitless.  In 
March 2000, the General Accounting Office published a report that concluded that no 
comprehensive source of information, to include quantitative analyses and anecdotal 
accounts, could be used to determine if race was the primary factor in making a stop.46  
Taking this into consideration, the disparate numbers clearly suggest that some 
other cause or causes led to black motorists being stopped and searched many times more 
than white motorists on the I-95 corridor in Maryland.  This is important, because it calls 
to mind the idea that there are indicators—both in addition to, and associated with, race—
that law enforcement officers could be using in their decision-making processes.  For the 
day-to-day patrolman, the various additional factors could vary depending on the 
situation and environment.  The last chapter of this thesis will attempt to capture the 
                                                 
46 U.S. General Accounting Office, Racial Profiling: Limited Data Available On Motorist Stops, GAO 
Report GGD-00-41 (Washington: March 2000), 1, 18–23. 
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different indicators that might play a role.  However, for a particular set of events like the 
Maryland Interstate-95 case, law enforcement officers were embarked on a very specific 
mission: to crack down on the distribution of drugs throughout the state.  This has 
important implications to the extent that race might have been relied upon in stopping, 
questioning, and searching motorists on I-95. 
Like any mission that is conducted in a law enforcement capacity, intelligence 
will likely play a large role in articulating exactly how that mission is going to be 
executed.  Law enforcement investigations produce detailed reports regarding the groups 
and individuals most responsible for the trafficking and distribution of illegal drugs 
throughout the state.  One such report comes from the U.S. Justice Department’s National 
Drug intelligence Center (NDIC).  The reports published by NDIC provide detailed 
descriptions, which include race, on the suspected drug importers and distributers in 
Maryland.   
If the criminal groups that are well known as the dominant source of the drug 
trafficking and distribution identify with a single race, then using race as a factor in 
attempting to narrow down the individuals involved is practically a foregone conclusion. 
For example, it is well known to law enforcement officials that Mexican criminal groups, 
such as the Latin Kings and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), are the dominant transporters of 
most of the methamphetamine, heroin and cocaine available in Maryland.47  This is not to 
say that law enforcement officers should be arbitrarily stopping and searching Hispanics.  
On the contrary, the simple fact that Mexican criminal groups are primarily responsible 
for the importing and distribution of these drugs in Maryland highlights the conclusion 
that race will be used, to some degree, by law enforcement to narrow the aperture for how 
their resources will be employed in a counterdrug strategy. 
Law enforcement officers in Maryland were aware of the ethnic backgrounds of 
the criminal groups predominantly responsible for the distribution of drugs in Maryland. 
This is completely overlooked in every analysis of the alleged use of racial profiling on 
                                                 
47 United States. National Drug Intelligence Center. Maryland Drug Threat Assessment, Johnstown, 
PA: U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, 2002, 
http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS36619, 25. 
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Interstate 95 that I have surveyed for this case study.  The findings of the Maryland case 
study are still worthwhile for the purpose of this thesis.  However, criminal assessments, 
like NDIC’s Maryland Threat Assessment, must be a factor when attempting to 
determine if race is being relied on too heavily in preventing crime. 
D. THE SOCIAL COST OF RACIAL PROFILING 
The Maryland I-95 case study represents a much larger issue: Racial disparities exist 
throughout the entire criminal justice system in the United States.48  As discussed previously, 
opponents of racial profiling point to racial bias as the reason for the disparate numbers, 
while proponents point to intervening variables not only to describe, but support, the 
disproportionate numbers.  Regardless of where one stands on the issue, it is important to 
consider the social cost of using race as the primary indicator in preventing crime. 
The primary social cost comes from the perception of guilt-by-association.  The 
idea that a member of a specific race is more likely to be engaging in a crime fuels 
dissent and alienation within that racial class.  Moreover, it intensifies a level of distrust 
between the officer and the community that the officer is in place to serve and protect.  
The guilt-by-association label might also cause a digression in racial justice.  For 
decades, the idea of equal protection under the law has been a cornerstone for an entire 
social movement that pursued a more equal and just nation.  In historical terms, we are 
still emerging from that era, so if race is being relied on as a primary indicator of crime, 
there is a sense from within the “targeted” communities that they are still viewed as 
unequal members of society.   
Profiling also has a cumulative effect, and it appears this country has reached the 
tipping point.  Word of an alleged case spreads quickly along the information highway, 
reaching members in communities all over the nation, so the effect reaches beyond the 
boundaries of the officer’s jurisdiction.  Recently in Massachusetts, a black Harvard 
professor accused a white Harvard police officer of racial profiling after the police officer 
arrested the professor in his own home while investigating a possible robbery in progress.  
                                                 
48 Merrick J. Bobb, Nicholas H. Miller, Ronald L. Davis and Oren Root, “Racial Profiling,” in Racial 
Profiling: Issues, Data, and Analyses, ed. Steven J. Muffler (New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc), 
31–39. 
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Racial profiling has become the dirty word in U.S. societal discourse.  The case exploded 
onto the center stage in a matter of hours, which even provoked President Barrack Obama 
into saying, “the Cambridge police acted stupidly.”49  Ironically, whether profiling is real 
or perceived, this case demonstrates just how divided the country truly is on the topic of 
racial profiling. 
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The data presented here from an in-depth case study of the I-95 events is an 
example of an empirical examination of this highly controversial topic.  The analysis 
presents four overarching measures of success: 
(1) Greater quantities of drugs, if not the majority, were found in just a 
handful of searches of black motorists, indicating that the targeting of 
black motorists on I-95 was successful in finding drug dealers. 
(2) While MSP has defended its practices under the argument that their tactics 
have led to the arrest of a handful of dealers, a very high number of black 
motorists were targeted, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to yield 
those results.  The resulting social consequences of the perceived targeting 
of black motorists were extremely high, exacerbating racial tensions and 
provoking lasting negative impacts on law enforcement-community 
relations. 
(3) There is no evidence to support or deny the claim that if MSP had pulled 
over and searched the same number of white motorists, that they would 
not have found a large amount of drugs or a handful of drug dealers. 
(4) Race is not a good indicator when relied on too heavily in preventing 
crime as black and white motorists are practically equal in hit rates, that is, 
they are just as likely to be found with some drugs. 
While racial profiling might have led to the seizure of large quantities of illegal drugs, the 
data also suggests that whites were slightly more likely to have some drugs.  While a few 
                                                 
49 Huma Khan and Michelle McPhee, “Obama Defends Criticism of Cambridge Police in Arrest of 
Gates,” July 23, 2009, on the ABC News Web site, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=8153681&page=1&page=1 (accessed October 28, 2009). 
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searches of black motorists did result in the seizure of several large quantities of drugs 
and the arrest of a handful of medium to large dealers, a lot of black motorists were 
stopped in order to yield these results.  
The impact of the I-95 racial profiling case highlights the resulting social costs of 
such a practice.   There are widespread accounts of people that believe they are being 
unfairly targeted by law enforcement because of their ethnicity or beliefs in Islam.  It is 
difficult to determine whether the accounts are founded or exaggerated.  Nevertheless, the 
perception of discriminating tactics is largely seen as racist and as a detriment to the 
social norms and values of American society.   
Thus, there are contrasting measures of success that must be noted.  The negative 
impact that racial and ethnic profiling has on minority community-police relations are 
viewed as a negative measure of success.  It is viewed as such because the benefits of 
racial profiling are minimal compared to the lasting social consequences of the 
discriminating methods that its use requires.  Ultimately, the social cost of racial or ethnic 
profiling is that its use increases the risk of marginalizing the race or ethnicity being 
profiled.  While this is not necessarily a quantifiable means of measuring success, the 
social cost exacerbates racial tensions in the U.S., a liberal democracy that is struggling 
to emerge from a more nefarious era in its history wherein racially-fueled bias was 
commonplace.  To this extent, and in such cases, racial or ethnic profiling is not an 
effective means in reducing crime. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Maryland I-95 case study presents a variety of measures of success when 
using race as a factor in preventing crime.  There is an additional finding that is 
highlighted by the I-95 case study: 
Given the fact that certain ethnic criminal groups were predominantly 
responsible for the distribution of drugs in Maryland, it is a foregone 
conclusion that race would be used, to some degree, in the counterdrug 
strategy.  The question remains as to when law enforcement officers cross 
the line in relying too heavily on race as an indicator in preventing crime. 
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If law enforcement officers know that certain ethnic gangs and criminal groups 
are predominantly responsible for the distribution of narcotics in Maryland, then it is a 
foregone conclusion that race is going to play a role, to some degree, in the counter- 
narcotics strategy.  Ultimately, this chapter highlights that, when race is being relied on 
too heavily in a policing strategy, unintended social consequences create degraded 
community relations with law enforcement, and exacerbate racial tensions by 
marginalizing an entire community.  The next chapter will provide the historical 
background of counterterrorism and demonstrate law enforcement’s new role in CT-
investigations and operations. 
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III. PREVENTING TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES:  
THE POST-9/11 COUNTERTERRORISM TRANSFORMATION 
AMIDST A NEW ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
In order to discuss profiling today, it is first necessary to understand how the 
conduct of counterterrorism has changed since 2001.  In this chapter, I present an in-
depth overview of the post-9/11 transformation of CT under the umbrella of homeland 
security and the methods and structure under which counterterrorism is accomplished.  
The current LE-IC relationship in counterterrorism is built around information sharing.  
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have an advanced network of information 
sharing that is used to track patterns of crime and cross-reference such trends with 
massive databases of known and suspected terrorists.  The end result is that 
Counterterrorism is now done by every police officer with a radio and patrol-car 
computer.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how the LE-IC relationship evolved after 9/11.   I 
do this first by highlighting the fundamental differences between the two communities 
before 9/11.  I then show how the law enforcement community characterized its vision 
for a national counterterrorism architecture that capitalizes on information sharing 
between the LE and intelligence communities, and how the concept of intelligence-led 
policing played a key role in such a vision.  Then, I highlight the major executive and 
legislative actions that provided the foundation for a new national CT-architecture.  I then 
demonstrate how the LE-IC interaction functions under the new CT-architecture.  This 
contributes to my thesis by illustrating that it is within this new architecture that 
complaints of ethnic profiling have rapidly emerged.  Many Muslims in the United States 
feel that they are the targets of a massive sweep by law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies to root out anyone that engages in political dissent or harbors ill-feelings 
towards the U.S. and its foreign policy.  Demonstrating how counterterrorism is 




intrusive manner, one that is perceived as purposefully targeting a specific group, such as 
Arabs and Muslims, under the assumption that members of that group are more likely to 
engage in terrorism. 
A. PRE-9/11 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES 
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. law enforcement community (LE) and the U.S. intelligence 
community (IC) were two mutually-exclusive entities.  On the one hand, the history of 
law enforcement in the United States holds fast to key objectives, such as criminal justice 
and investigations, and building a case with evidentiary support to present to the court of 
law.  As such, law enforcement typically “…invokes privacy and investigative case 
secrecy to protect its information…” and the integrity of the case.50  On the other hand, 
the IC has historically been an instrument used to counter foreign threats to the national 
security of the United States.  After all, the IC was created in response to the Japanese 
attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and later focused its energy and resources on the Soviet 
Union and its allies during the Cold War.51   
The relationship of the intelligence and law enforcement communities prior to 
9/11 cannot be described as two dichotomous entities with the same overall end goal.  On 
the contrary, the two communities operate on entirely different playing fields, with 
different rules, different cultures, different styles of play, and even different objectives.  
The U.S. intelligence community has a long history of protecting its sources and methods 
to safeguard its capabilities.52  Law enforcement has a history of public safety by 
controlling crime and upholding the nation’s civil laws and statutes.  It is not surprising 
that key concepts such as “integration” and “information sharing” have been cited 
throughout the literature that focuses on the LE-IC relationship building in the post-9/11 
era of homeland security. 
                                                 
50 National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence 
Community Relationship: Can’t We All Just Get Along? (Washington, D.C.: NDIC Press, June 2007), vii. 
51 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets To Policy, 4th ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 
2009), 13. 
52 NDIC, Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship, vii. 
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While much of the homeland security literature places an emphasis on improving 
the communications link between law enforcement and the IC, the IC was primarily in 
the spotlight after 9/11.  The spotlight highlighted a more negative view of the IC.  Some 
intelligence critiques suggest that the intelligence community could not unfasten itself 
from its methods used during the Cold War, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991.53  Those who argue this point posit that the IC’s inability to adapt to the growing 
threat of terrorism in the 1990s was the primary reason it failed to counter the overall 
threat that terrorism posed to U.S. national security.54 
The literature suggests that the LE community was also about to undergo a major 
transformation.  Prior to 9/11, law enforcement appeared less concerned with indications 
and warnings, except within their own jurisdictions, and more concerned with building a 
case for prosecution.55  To prosecute a case, the evidence must meet a certain legal 
standard so that it may be admissible in court.56  The evidence must also comply with 
strict custody standards to maintain the integrity of the case under investigation.57  An 
exchange of information would likely compromise such integrity.  Now, law enforcement 
is part of a national-level indications and warning process that traditionally fell into the 
realm of the IC.  Additionally, both LE and IC are now developing protocols to legally 
and effectively share information.58  
B. A NEW APPROACH TO PREVENTING TERRORISM 
The law enforcement community first united with the purpose of imploring the IC 
to loosen its grip on information pertaining to suspected terrorism shortly after 9/11.  In 
October 2001, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) called for a 
                                                 
53 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 3. 
54 Ibid.  Zegart argues that the failure to see the overall threat of terrorism is a major contribute to the 
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55 Ibid. 
56 Mark V. Kauppi, “Counterterrorism Analysis and Homeland Security” in David G. Kamien, ed., 
The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 416. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 425. 
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summit to discuss the problems with the LE-IC relationship, and to make 
recommendations to resolve those problems.59  Already, the role that law enforcement 
would have in the post-9/11 era of homeland security was clear: Counterterrorism was no 
longer a term that would be associated with glamorous and super-secret “James Bond” 
figures.  In March 2002, the re-invention of the LE-IC relationship materialized when the 
IACP’s Intelligence Sharing Summit joined in calling for a totally revamped LE-IC 
coordination effort, by calling for a national intelligence plan.60  “The result was the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP).”61   
The NCISP became the blueprint for the now commonplace term in homeland 
security dialogue: intelligence-led policing.62 The term itself originated in the Kent 
Constabulary of Great Britain.63  The U.S. Justice Department provides an optimal 
summary of the concept’s origins: 
Officials believed that a relatively few number of people were responsible 
for a comparatively large number of crimes.  They believed that police 
officers would have the best effect on crime by focusing on the most 
prevalent offenses occurring in their jurisdiction…by prioritizing calls and 
referring less serious calls for general nonpolice services to other 
agencies…more time was available to create intelligence units to focus, 
initially, on property-related offenses in each of the jurisdiction’s nine 
service areas…Intelligence-led policing focuses on key criminal activities.  
Once crime problems are identified and quantified through intelligence 
assessments, key criminals can be targeted for investigation and 
prosecution.64 
The IACP stressed adopting this model and argued that it is a proactive guide to policing, 
i.e., relying on intelligence to guide operations.65  However, the IACP took this model 
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63 Ibid., 9. 
64 Ibid. 
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Recommendations from the IACP Intelligence Summit (Washington D.C., August 2002), 13. 
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several steps further by emphasizing the creation of mechanisms to share criminal 
intelligence.  By this time, the sharing of information implied the sharing of all 
information on criminal activity, to include terrorist activity. 
During the 2002 IACP summit, the participants decided that the model of 
intelligence-led policing is the most effective and promising way to establish guidelines 
of sharing criminal intelligence.  They defined criminal intelligence as “information 
compiled, analyzed and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor 
criminal activity.”66  Such guidelines for sharing criminal intelligence would eventually 
become the template for common operating procedures under which all local, state and 
federal law enforcement organizations will operate.67  The template applies to all law 
enforcement agencies, not just the FBI, or the state police, or the police of large 
municipalities such as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) or the New York City 
Police Department (NYPD); all law enforcement agencies serving every town, city, 
county, state, and tribe in America are expected to adopt this new template of criminal 
intelligence-sharing.  To put that in perspective, as of 2004, there were 17,876 state and 
local law enforcement agencies in the United States, 61% of them were local police 
departments; nearly half of all state and local law enforcement agencies employed fewer 
than 10 officers, 31% employed fewer than 5 officers, and 12% employed just one 
officer.68 
What does this new template of intelligence-led policing and criminal 
intelligence-sharing look like?  Intelligence-led policing incorporates an age-old doctrine 
of the IC into investigative procedures of law enforcement, which now include 
indications and warnings via intelligence analysis.  That age-old doctrine is the  
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intelligence cycle.  The NCISP follows a six-step process: planning and direction, 
collection, processing/collation, analysis, dissemination, and re-evaluation, depicted in 
Figure 2.69 
 
Figure 2.   The Intelligence Cycle of Intelligence-led Policing70 
Each step of the cycle in Figure 2 incorporates specific methods that the law 
enforcement community now uses in partnership with the intelligence community.  These 








                                                 
















(1) Planning and Direction: 
a. Planning on how data will be collected 
b. Assess existing data and determine what gaps need to be filled-in 
c. Guidelines must prohibit illegal methods of obtaining information 
d. Planning requires a customer or agency to identify the outcomes it 
wants to achieve from the collection efforts 
(2) Collection: 
a. Physical surveillance, either in person or by videotape 
b. Electronic surveillance, either by trap and trace or by wiretap 
c. Confidential informants 
d. Undercover operations 
e. Open sources such as newspaper reports, internet sites, blogs, etc 
f. Public records, such as deeds or tax records 
(3) Processing & Collation: 
a. Sifting through data, eliminate useless data, place data in logical 
order 
b. Data-mining and text-mining technology 
c. Evaluate data on reliability and validity 
(4) Analysis: 
a. Convert information to intelligence 
b. Determine further leads 
c. Develop conclusions 
d. Make recommendations 
(5) Dissemination: 
a. Getting the information to those who need it to those that have the 
right to use it in whatever form deemed appropriate 
(6) Re-evaluation: 
a. Examine the product to determine its effectiveness, part of this comes 
from the customer, or those that are using the intelligence, providing 
feedback on missing data or holes to begin the process again 
 
Figure 3.   The Intelligence Cycle of Intelligence-Led Policing71 
At this point in the transformation of the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities, two concepts are beginning to merge.  Those two concepts are the early 
architecture of the NCISP, and the cycle of intelligence-led policing and its individual 
components.  A product of the merger is the establishment of a framework that combines 
                                                 
71 U.S. Department of Justice, Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture, 6–7. 
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a bottom-up feeder network for the flow of criminal data, information, statistics and 
trends, with the technology to fuse all of that information into one giant mixing and 
sorting mechanism.  Figure 4 describes this new “fusion” architecture.  This mechanism 
creates the potential for levels of analysis of criminal intelligence that reaches well 
beyond jurisdictional boundaries.  The mechanism that mixes and sorts all the data being 
fed into it by law enforcement agencies is called a fusion center.  The fusion center not 
only changes the way law enforcement approaches crime control, but it opened the 
aperture for the key role that law enforcement officers, in all agencies regardless of their 
size, play in CT-operations.  However, the realization of fusion centers was still several 
years off. 
 
Figure 4.   Conceptual Framework of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Architecture 72 
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C. LEGISLATIVE GROUNDWORK: THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT 
By the end of 2002, the law enforcement community fully understood that CT 
needed to be incorporated into its policing tactics.  The key instrument to incorporating 
CT into all levels of law enforcement is intelligence.  While the NCISP continued to 
develop through the concept of intelligence-led policing, a key strategic document was 
about to be released by the Chief Executive.  The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, promulgated by former President George W. Bush via the Office of Homeland 
Security, formalized the vision for a methodical transformation of counterterrorism and 
homeland security.73  Moreover, the National Strategy for Homeland Security increased 
the momentum of transforming domestic CT-operations. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security is a comprehensive vision for 
preventing terrorist attacks in the United States.  While it clearly discusses restructuring 
the way the U.S. responds to emergencies, its primary emphasis is on the prevention of 
terrorism.74  The 2002 Strategy identifies six critical mission areas: Intelligence and 
Warning, Border and Transportation Security, Domestic Counterterrorism, Protecting 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, Defending Against Catastrophic Threats, and 
Emergency Preparedness and Response.75  Across the entire spectrum of critical mission 
areas, the Strategy invokes the two key ideas being discussed in this review that 
transformed the nature of CT-operations: 
(1) “Reorienting law enforcement organizations to focus on counterterrorism 
objectives.”76 
(2) “Streamline information sharing among [and between] intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies.”77 
                                                 
73 The Office of Homeland Security was established via Executive Order (E.O.) 13228, signed by 
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After the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security was published, there was no 
question about the role that law enforcement would have in domestic CT-operations, and 
no question that mechanisms for information sharing would be central to improving the 
efficacy of such operations. 
After the release of the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, several 
key events occurred.  The first and most instrumental of these events was the signing of 
the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002.78  With regard to the traditional 
impediments that stand between the law enforcement and intelligence communities, the 
language of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 articulates, as law, mechanisms for 
improving information availability.  Several examples of such mechanisms exist in the 
Homeland Security Act.  One example of an important mechanism that is designed to do 
away with barriers to information sharing among and between the LE-IC is provided 
here, it states: 
Any investigative or law enforcement officer…[who] has obtained 
knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, 
or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents or derivative 
evidence to any appropriate Federal, State, local, or foreign government 
official to the extent that such contents or derivative evidence reveals a 
threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power, domestic or international sabotage, 
domestic or international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence gathering 
activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an 
agent of a foreign power, within the United States or elsewhere, for the 
purpose of preventing or responding to such a threat.79 
The importance of this language is that it is a step towards breaking the IC from its 
traditional ways of protecting its methods and sources during the collection process of the 
intelligence cycle (see Figure 3), all in the name of preventing, among other threats, 
terrorism.  Similarly, with law enforcement traditionally clinging to protecting the access 
and custody of evidence for use in investigating and prosecuting a case, this language 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland,  x. 
78 Text of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), on the Department of Homeland 
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also provides the legal precedent for sharing information to other agencies; again, all in 
the name of preventing terrorism.  Essentially, it is a major leap in eliminating the 
deeply-rooted historical impediments to information sharing that I presented earlier in 
this review. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also established the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).80  Albeit a massive reorganization of the USG, the 
establishment of DHS as a cabinet-level department of the Chief Executive is a major 
overhaul in the way this country is organized, to prevent and respond to terrorism.  The 
responsibilities of DHS are broad and far-reaching.  The original mandate of DHS, as 
prescribed in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, is to prevent terrorist attacks at home, 
reduce the vulnerability to terrorist attacks at home, and to minimize the damage and 
assist in the recovery from any attacks that may occur.81  More specifically, DHS plays a 
key role in the transformation of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. 
The Department of Homeland Security is not only granted sweeping access to 
intelligence, of any content and source, but it plays a primary role in improving the 
sharing of such information within the new LE-IC framework.82  Title II of the Homeland 
Security Acts directs the creation on an Under Secretary position that is responsible for 
information analysis.  Here, the language is very specific: 
(1) To access, receive and  analyze law enforcement information, intelligence 
information, and other information from agencies of the Federal 
Government, State, and local government agencies (including law 
enforcement agencies), and private sector entities, and to integrate such 
information in order to– 
a. Identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the 
homeland 
b. Detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States 
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c. Understand such threats in light of actual and potential 
vulnerabilities of the homeland.83  
This clause highlights that the mechanisms for improving information sharing for the 
purpose of preventing terrorist attacks are now becoming more narrowly defined.  
Keywords such as integrate, identify, assess, detect, and understand all echo the 
comprehensive nature of how CT-operations will take shape in the United States.  
Additionally, the Under Secretary position is responsible for the following: 
To review, analyze and make recommendations for improvements in the 
policies and procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement 
information, intelligence information, intelligence-related information, and 
other information relating to homeland security within the Federal 
Government and between the Federal Government and State and local 
government agencies and authorities.84 
Title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 specifically targets the creation of 
methods, procedures, policies, and entities that will together act as a system for the 
sharing of information pertaining to potential terrorist threats among and between the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities. 
D. CENTRAL AND SHARED KNOWLEDGE MERGES WITH JOINT 
INTEROPERABILITY 
Following the signing of the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the 
Homeland Security Act, the next key events to the transformation of domestic CT-
operations are the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and Terrorist 
Screening Center (TSC).  Like the many provisions of the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security and Homeland Security Act, the establishment of these two 
institutions further drives the transformation of CT-operations, and brings that 
transformation to fruition.  The TTIC (pronounced “tee-tick”) and TSC become tools of 
the law enforcement and intelligence communities to warehouse the names, along with 
their history of contact with law enforcement, of specific individuals that are considered  
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persons of interest in the quest to prevent terrorism in the United States.85  Moreover, 
both the TTIC and TSC bring about the first set of sweeping reactions from the public, 
especially from those of Muslim identity. 
The intention to create the Terrorist Threat Integration Center first became public 
knowledge in January 2003.  In the 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush 
announced that he is: 
…instructing the leaders of the FBI, the CIA, the Homeland Security, and 
the Department of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center, to merge and analyze all [emphasis added] threat information in a 
single location.86 
The TTIC embodied promise for the integrated capabilities such an agency can bring to 
the counterterrorism transformation, but is surrounded in controversy because of its 
organizational attachment to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and because of its 
most significant assessment product: the consolidated master terrorist watch list.  The 
TTIC was directed to play a lead role in overseeing a national CT-tasking and 
requirements system, maintaining shared databases, and maintaining an up-to-date master 
database of known and suspected terrorists.87 
The creation of the TTIC instigates some early signs of the public’s general 
concern about the CIA conducting domestic intelligence operations in the United States, 
with no apparent accountability.  Most notably, the ACLU immediately opened a 
lobbying campaign to urge congress to institute measures that prohibit the CIA from 
using its foreign intelligence methods on American soil.88  However, even the ACLU 
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later went on the record to recognize the necessity of domestic surveillance, but qualified 
its position by stating that domestic surveillance must serve the goals of preventing 
terrorism, espionage, and other serious crimes, not the political goals of the Chief 
Executive.89  To this end, the ACLU seemed more concerned about the lack of any form 
of accountability through Congressional oversight, and the potential for civil liberties 
abuses that could result. 
Negative reactions to the proposed structure of the TTIC also resided in Congress.  
Concerns emanating from Congress generally echoed those of the ACLU.  For example, 
some members of Congress feared that the creation of the TTIC could impede the 
statutory mandate of DHS described earlier in this review.  Select members of the House 
of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security questioned why the TTIC needed to 
report to the Director of CIA vice the U.S. Attorney General or the Director of DHS, 
citing the dangerous potential for using the foreign intelligence services in the capacity of 
an unchecked domestic intelligence program.90  Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA), 
who chaired the Committee when the hearing was held in July 2003, stated that such 
activity would re-open a “sad chapter in [American] history that must remain closed.”91 
Much of the Committee was inherently against the creation of the TTIC under its 
current configuration, and expressed deep concern for the implications of placing the 
agency under the CIA.   Placing the agency under the CIA stands in contradiction of the 
DHS statutory mandate under the 2002 Homeland Security Act.  There was also some 
speculation that the White House’s decision to do so is deliberate in order to cloak its 
intentions to expand a sweeping and unimpeded domestic intelligence program within the 
United States.  The committee asserted its viewpoint that the TTIC adds confusion to 
which agency will be the primary conduit for CT-information sharing, and made its 
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position clear that our nation’s “carefully crafted and vitally important civil liberties” 
would be better protected with the TTIC placed under DHS.92  
The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is another entity that brings the 
transformation of CT-operations to fruition.  Homeland Security Presidential Decision 
Directive Six (HSPD-6) announced the creation of the TSC.93  The TTIC and TSC should 
not be viewed as two mutually exclusive entities.  On the contrary, the TTIC feeds, or 
disseminates, its complete threat analysis data into the TSC database, but that data is 
limited to international suspects; the FBI feeds data on domestic suspects.94  After both 
Congress and DHS voiced their concerns over the dangers of the TTIC conducting 
domestic intelligence operations, the TTIC’s mandate focused only on compiling threat 
data of known or suspected terrorists of international origin, but the TTIC would soon 
become part of a larger organization. 
Local, state, and federal joint LE-IC interoperability is finally established when 
the capabilities of the TSC meet law enforcement databanks.  The primary databank is 
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).  The NCIC is a national database of 
individual criminal histories, or files, that have the ability to reach to every state and local 
[police] patrol car computer or personal radio.95  The NCIC also contains information on 
wanted persons, missing persons, stolen cars, and stolen property; law enforcement 
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officers refer to such files as “hot” files.96  Before the inception of the TSC, there was no 
established connection between the NCIC and the TSC.97 
After approximately one year of operating as a fully-functioning integrated 
terrorist threat analysis center, the TTIC was subsumed into the newly-established 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which is a component of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI).  Among other important roles, such as 
conducting the terrorist threat matrix in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), the NCTC 
maintains an “all-source datamart on terrorist identities for use by the entire CT-
community…” otherwise known as the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment 
(TIDE).”98  The TSC is now fully operational.  According to Jerry Berman, the President 
of the Center for Democracy and Technology in 2004, the consolidated watchlist 
comprised approximately 50,000 known or suspected terrorists, and that number is not 
just made up of individuals with ties to Islamic terrorist organizations, but also includes 
individuals with affiliations to any group that has conducted a terrorist act.99  By 2007, 
the master list allegedly grew to near 800,000 known or suspected terrorists of domestic 
and international origins.100 
The most important aspect of the TSC to the transformation of CT-operations in 
the United States is that the TSC is the primary hub that links investigative efforts of all 
local law enforcement officers, from any jurisdiction in the nation, with the FBI’s 
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counterterrorism division.101  The compatibility of NCIC and TSC puts every law 
enforcement officer in the nation on the front lines of counterterrorism, i.e., this is where 
the crucial “exchange of relevant information” now begins.102   Essentially, this is the 
nucleus of modern counterterrorism investigations and operations. 
The NCIC and TSC exchange uses an input/output process by cross-referencing 
all throughput information with the data warehoused in the TSC.  James McMahon, the 
Director of the Office of Public Security in the State of New York in 2004 testified before 
a Joint Hearing in the House of Representatives and provided a detailed description of the 
exchange between NCIC and TSC.  I have summarized this process.  Typically, there are 
three scenarios that a patrol officer or detective might expect when they encounter a 
person during a traffic stop or ongoing investigation: 
(1) “Red Light” Stop: the officer conducts a name and date of birth (DOB) 
query in NCIC; NCIC returns information sufficient to arrest the subject, 
such as being wanted by another state or local jurisdiction. 
(2) “Green Light” Stop: based on the name and DOB inquiry, the person 
stopped is not actively wanted by any law enforcement agency. 
(3) “Yellow Light” Stop: the individual the police officer detained or stopped 
is not actively wanted, but the officer has suspicions about whether the 
individual has links to terrorism, for example, the individual was seen 
videotaping public transportation infrastructure or nuclear power plants.103 
During the NCIC inquiry of a “Yellow Light” stop, the officer might receive a return 
from NCIC, or “hit,” known as a Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF), 
marking the individual as a person of interest.104   This “hit” will direct the officer to 
contact the Terrorist Screening Center for additional direction; the TSC will provide 
additional information in any one of four classifications: arrest, detain, investigate or 
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query. 105  Meanwhile, when the situation necessitates, the TSC coordinates with the 
FBI’s counterterrorism division for the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to begin 
coordinating and sharing information pertaining to the investigation with the state or local 
law enforcement officer. 
The newly-established interoperability of the TSC and the NCIC databases means 
that CT-operations have the eyes, ears, intuition, and training of over 800,000 sworn 
local, state, and federal law enforcement officers in the United States.106  Figure 5 depicts 
a simple diagram illustrating the new role that all law enforcement officers now play in 
domestic CT-operations.  It seems that the visions and recommendations of the IACP, 
and many others, are now realized in a modern national CT-network. 
 
Figure 5.   Law Enforcement Role in CT-operations 
By mid-2004, the newly-articulated environment of intelligence-driven 
counterterrorism had substantially altered pre-9/11 barriers that previously obstructed law 
enforcement’s reach into the spectrum of CT-operations.  This new landscape of LE-IC 
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http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sandlle.htm (accessed August 17, 2009). 
 45
integration is summarily described by FBI Director Robert Mueller in his 2004 testimony 
before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: 
Prior to Sept. 11, 2001...various walls existed that prevented the 
realization of that vision. Legal walls–real and perceived–prevented the 
integration of intelligence and criminal tools in terrorism investigations. 
Cultural walls–real and perceived–continued to hamper coordination 
between the FBI, the CIA and other members of the intelligence 
community.  Operational walls–real and perceived–between the FBI and 
our partners in state and local law enforcement continued to be a 
challenge...the legal walls between intelligence and law enforcement 
operations that handicapped us before 9/11 have been eliminated.107 
Here, Director Mueller highlights that the cultural and legal barriers to criminal-
intelligence sharing have diminished to a point of minimal resistance.  Meanwhile, the 
architecture for the criminal-intelligence sharing network is advancing at a rapid rate of 
expansion via the widespread construction of fusion centers across the United States.  
E. STATE AND REGIONAL “FUSION CENTERS” EMERGE 
By this stage of the transformation of CT-operations in the United States, the 
concept of fusing information from all sources is rapidly being implemented in the 
federal government.  Counterterrorism capacity building of the federal law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies is now heavily intelligence-centric, and rapidly expanding its 
integrated network.  It appears that the concepts founded in the original NCISP are now 
being realized at the national level, and are already being realized at the state and local 
levels, as well, through the joint interoperability of the NCIC and TSC.  Meanwhile, the 
public is expressing growing concerns for such a broadened capacity and its implications 
to the protection of their civil liberties.  Those concerns will deepen as the capacity for 
collecting and merging information on individuals, their backgrounds, and their activities 
within the United States expands into the creation of state and regional “fusion” centers 
across the nation. 
Recall that when the Kent Constabulary in Great Britain developed the concept of 
intelligence-led policing, it focused on identifying and prioritizing patterns of crime.  
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Fusion centers also focus on identifying and prioritizing patterns of crimes.108  Once 
crime trends are identified, they can be prioritized.  Moreover, a strategy can be 
developed to focus on the trend, such a strategy will take into account several factors, 
such as: where the pattern of crime is occurring, they type of crime, and the criminal 
elements involved.  In essence, fusion centers follow an “all crimes” approach, built 
around the concept of intelligence-led policing.109  This approach was part of the 
foundational groundwork of the information sharing network established between the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities, and the same approach is being built into the 
concept of the fusion center. 
The fusion center is a direct descendant of the NCISP.  The Justice Department 
defines a fusion center as: 
…a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, 
expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their 
ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist 
activity.110 
The most fundamental idea behind the fusion center, aside from intelligence-led policing, 
is that “good policing is good terrorism prevention.”111  One representative of the 
Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center (AcTIC) was quoted as stating: 
We call our approach all-crimes…that include terrorism because there are 
numerous types of crimes that are associated with terrorism: money 
laundering, fraud, money being put toward the support of terrorist 
acts…112 
This follows the argument that crime prevention and the prevention of terrorism are inter-
related.113   
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Fusion centers bring together dozens of agencies and entities from the private 
sector in an inter-agency environment.  During the period from 2004–present, the all-
crimes approach to the fusion centers is realized across the nation.  In larger states, there 
may be as many as four regional fusion centers to cover the entire region; however, each 
state essentially has one primary designated fusion center.  According to the National 
Fusion Center Coordination Group (NFCCG), as of January 2009, all 50 states now have 
fusion centers set up and functioning as intelligence analysis centers for their designated 
regions. 
F. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: THE ONE PERCENT 
DOCTRINE AND THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
Ron Suskind’s The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of its 
Enemies Since 9/11 details first- and second-hand accounts of the actors that perpetrated 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the actors that shaped America’s response.  He delivers an 
inclusive account of the primary mover that grabbed hold of the United States’ top public 
executives, intelligence chiefs, and law enforcement agents, and propelled them, along 
with the entire nation, into the war on terror.  Suskind describes this primary mover as 
the one-percent doctrine.  The one-percent doctrine is a way of thinking that stipulates 
that if there is a one-percent chance of a WMD event occurring on the U.S. homeland, 
than the U.S. must treat it as a certainty.114  The one-percent doctrine began with Dick 
Cheney commenting on intelligence that led CIA officials to believe that Pakistani 
scientists could be helping Al-Qaeda construct a nuclear weapon.115  Cheney’s 
conclusion was the catalyst for the expedient quest to find and prevent a terrorist 
organization from using a weapon of mass destruction in the United States. 
The reality of the post-9/11 era is personified in the one-percent doctrine, which 
incited the FBI and CIA to attempt to find a trail that, in some cases, never existed.  
Racing through the minds of the men charged to find them, stop them, as Suskind puts it, 
“was an impossible fight, that the enemy could be anywhere, plotting, unseen, 
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undetectable, and that they couldn’t stop thinking about buildings burning and planes and 
bombs in malls, night after night.”116  If there ever were a strategy to define the U.S.’s 
post 9/11 CT-strategy, the one-percent doctrine was the unwritten dogma of such 
strategy.   
If the one-percent doctrine is an unwritten dogma that might be guiding some of 
the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the USA PATRIOT Act is the legal 
framework that gives law enforcement and intelligence agencies broader and, as some 
claim, more discretionary powers in operating under the new architecture of 
counterterrorism.  A complete analysis of the Patriot Act is not within the scope of this 
thesis.  The Patriot Act is important to this thesis, however, because it might be seen as 
the enabling force that was seen as an intrusive tool used to root out individuals within 
the Muslim community that harbor political dissent or ill-feelings towards the USG and 
its foreign policy. 
It is not enough to consider events of racial, ethnic, or religious profiling and 
argue the utility or disutility of such a technique without framing the discussion in greater 
context.  The greater context is the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  Two events that 
demonstrate the tone within the USG following 9/11 are the one-percent doctrine and the 
passing of the USA PATRIOT Act.  The two concepts cast a permanent shadow over the 
transformation of CT-operations and, together, they catalyze the manifestation of 
widespread fear and suspicion of Muslims in U.S. society, which is often the primary 
rationale behind arguments that favor profiling individuals of Muslim identity. 
G. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the current LE-IC relationship in counterterrorism is built around 
information sharing.  Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have an advanced 
network of information sharing that is used to track patterns of crime and cross-reference 
such trends with massive databases of known and suspected terrorists.  The end result is 
that Counterterrorism is now done by every police officer with a radio and patrol-car 
computer.  I recognize the challenge in depicting the entire transformation in a single 
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visualization.  Nevertheless, this framework depicted in Figure 6 describes the enablers of 
CT techniques now used by law enforcement.  The new architecture of counterterrorism 
is composed of a heterogeneous mixture of new legal precedents, specifically pertaining 
to domestic intelligence collection, and new methods of crime control that is 
accomplished by analyzing patterns of crime and prioritizing resources, as described in 
the framework of intelligence-led policing.   
 
Figure 6.   Post-9/11 LE-IC Transformation of CT-operations117 
It is within this new architecture that complaints of ethnic profiling have rapidly 
emerged.  Many Muslims in the United States feel that they are the targets of a massive 
sweep by law enforcement and intelligence agencies to root out anyone that engages in 
political dissent or harbors ill-feelings towards the U.S. and its foreign policy.  In 
understanding the new architecture of counterterrorism and the role of law enforcement, 
it becomes more apparent that the tools for counterterrorism are broad and susceptible to 
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abuse.  This will become important in my final chapter, where I attempt to illustrate what 
actual law enforcement officers do use in their rationale for reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause, the main finding of such an exploratory survey suggests that law 
enforcement officers are well aware of the perils of relying too heavily on factors such as 
race, ethnicity and religion, and there are dozens of visual and behavioral indicators that 
law enforcement officers use that do not rely on such factors.  
In the next chapter, I present and argue two hypotheses that support the claim that 
profiling Muslims is actually counterproductive to an effective long-term CT-strategy.  
While the I-95 case study indicated that, assuming profiling was in fact used, the 
technique was successful in finding drug dealers.  This suggested that similar results 
might be found when applying the technique to Muslims in CT-operations.  However, the 
arguments that I present in Chapter IV suggest that the social costs of profiling Muslims 
are not only just as high, if not higher, but that the technique is more than likely 
counterproductive, i.e., it will actually work against an effective long-term CT-strategy.  
Chapter IV highlights that framing profiling in greater context, such as issues of identity, 
assimilation and integration, and the strategy and objectives of Islamic terrorist 
organizations indicate that profiling Muslims works against an effective long-term CT-
strategy.  Lastly, I will attempt to illustrate that, while the perception of ethnic profiling 
persists among members of the Muslim community, the technique does not appear to 





IV. ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS PROFILING IN THE CONTEXT 
OF PREVENTING TERRORISM 
This was racial profiling…We know these boys. They are just like us. We 
watch them play soccer. We pray with them. We know their parents and 
their brothers and sisters and wives. If these six are suspects, then so is 
everyone else. 
-Neighbors of Lackawanna Six Terror Cell, Lackawanna, NY 
In this chapter, I argue that ethnic and religious profiling is counterproductive to 
an effective long-term counterterrorism strategy.  I do this by presenting and examining 
two hypotheses that support this claim: first, that profiling affects issues involving 
identity and exacerbates the sense of social and political detachment of Muslims living in 
the United States, which could increase the propensity for radicalization.  Second, that 
profiling plays directly into the strategy of Islamic terrorist organizations and further 
weakens the United States by isolating and dividing it, both internally and externally.  
Next, I illustrate that, while complaints of ethnic profiling have existed since 9/11, the 
technique does not appear to have been used by law enforcement in the disruption of 
actual terrorist plots.  I do so by presenting an in-depth analysis of twelve Islamic terrorist 
plots that have been foiled by law enforcement since 9/11 and highlighting that the 
disruption of these plots does not appear to have involved any form of racial, ethnic or 
religious profiling. 
The primary scope of this chapter is to present the findings that support the claim 
that profiling Muslims might be considered counterproductive to an effective long-term 
CT-strategy.  My primary findings suggest that profiling Muslims is counterproductive to 
an effective long-term CT-strategy for the following reasons: 
(1) Profiling Muslims—either real or perceived, increases the extent that 
members of the Muslim diaspora feel marginalized or in a state of 
isolation from their receiving society vis-à-vis the United States.   
The knowledge we have about the relationship between identity, including integration 
and assimilation, and the factors that lead to radicalization within the Muslim diaspora 
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suggests that profiling actually increases an individual’s social and political detachment 
from the host society.  The increased sense of social and political detachment, in turn, 
makes the use of violence to defend an identity a more attractive alternative.  For these 
reasons, ethnic profiling does not appear to be an effective tool in a long-term strategy to 
preventing terrorism. 
The second reason follows from an understanding of the objectives and strategy 
of Islamic terrorist organizations: 
(2) Profiling Muslims—either real or perceived, essentially plays directly into 
the strategy of Islamic terrorist organizations, in effect, aiding their 
legitimacy within the Muslim diaspora and opening the aperture for the 
recruiting efforts of radical Islamic social networks. 
There are supporting arguments to this finding.  Grievances of Islamic terrorist 
organizations generally stem from accusations of racism and disrespect for human rights.  
The objectives of Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda are to undermine, 
isolate, and divide the United States.  The strategy is to use our own democratic 
principles of civil liberties against us, and draw the U.S. into a trap by portraying itself as 
fundamentally racist and willing to arbitrarily forego even its own democratic principles.  
This suggests that ethnic profiling actually aids Islamic terrorist organizations by 
demonstrating to their target Muslim population that the U.S. is against them.  
A. WHY PROFILING MUSLIMS IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO AN 
EFFECTIVE CT-STRATEGY  
There are many opponents to profiling who view ethnic profiling of Muslims as 
counterproductive to preventing terrorism simply because it is a violation of our 
constitutional civil liberties and contradictory to our democratic values.  On the other 
hand, there are many who argue that ethnic profiling of Muslims is simply a common 
sense approach to conducting counterterrorism.  This argument is usually predicated on 
the premise that Arab males who are practitioners of Islam are more likely to be 
terrorists.  The literature on identity, as it pertains to integration and assimilation, and the 
grand strategy of Islamic terrorist organizations, suggest that both arguments are 
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insufficient.  In order to understand the counterproductive nature of a technique such as 
ethnic profiling pertaining to its use in CT-operations, it is necessary to understand the 
role that assimilation and integration play in an individual’s decision to become a 
terrorist.  Moreover, one must understand the objectives of Islamic terrorist organizations.  
A clear understanding of both highlights two hypotheses: First, that ethnic profiling of 
Muslims exacerbates the conditions that support incipient radicalization and the 
propensity to use violence within the Muslim community; and second, the technique 
plays into the strategy of Islamic terrorist organizations and gives such organizations 
what they are looking for: a divided and isolated United States. 
1. Ethnic, Cultural, and Religious Identity and the Role of Assimilation 
and Integration in Radicalization within the Muslim Diaspora in the 
United States 
There appears to be an existential battle taking place on the social landscape in the 
United States, which is manifested in a clash of ethnic, cultural and religious identities.  
In a 2006 Gallup Poll, when Americans were asked about what they admire about the 
Muslim world, the most common answer (32 %) was, “nothing.”118  Distrust of Muslims 
is higher now than after 9/11.119  The apparent clash of identities is rooted in suspicion, 
distrust and fear.  The clash in identities appears most prevalent in host societies where 
the ethnic, cultural and religious traditions are in sharp contrast to the ethnic, cultural and 
religious identities shared by members of a diaspora.  This pertains specifically to the 
Muslim community living in the United States, many of whom are immigrants, and has 
become more apparent since the terrorist attacks on 9/11.120  Issues of identity among  
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 54
members of the Muslim diaspora, blended with our understanding of radicalization and 
terrorism, provide useful insights into understanding the counterproductive nature of 
profiling. 
Much like the difficulty in defining terrorism, there is no single definition of 
diaspora that reaches consensus across migration literature.121  Some 21st century 
scholars insist that in order to be called a diaspora, there must be a geographically 
concentrated population of immigrants of the same ethno-nationality within a receiving 
country who have not given up the ties to their homeland.  This definition is not 
necessarily incorrect, as it does briefly touch on a characteristic of diasporas, but it does 
not satisfy the global applicability of diasporas nor does it recognize the deep religious 
and historical roots associated with the term.  Instead, this section will follow a broader 
definition of diaspora:  
A people dispersed by whatever cause to more than one location.  The 
people dispersed to different lands may harbor thoughts of return, may not 
fully assimilate into their host countries, and may maintain relationships 
with other communities in the diaspora.122 
This thesis also follows Robin Cohen’s six characteristic features of diaspora: 
(1) They, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from an original ‘centre’ to 
two or more foreign regions.  Dispersal from an original centre is often 
accompanied by the memory of a single traumatic event that provides the 
folk memory of the great historic injustice that binds the group together; 
(2) they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original 
homeland including its location, history and achievements; 
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(3) they believe they are not—and perhaps can never be—fully accepted in 
their host societies and so remain partly separate; 
(4) their ancestral home is idealized and it is thought that, when conditions are 
favorable, either they, or their descendants should return; 
(5) they believe all members of the diaspora should be committed to the 
maintenance or restoration of the original homeland and to its safety and 
prosperity, and in some cases, even the very creation of an ‘imagined’ 
homeland;  
(6) they continue in various ways to relate to that homeland and their ethno-
communal consciousness and solidarity are in an important way defined 
by the existence of such a relationship.123 
Each of these features reveals important contextual insights that can help explain the 
occurrence of radicalization and terrorism within the Muslim diaspora in the United 
States.  The “concept of diaspora can be applied when members of an expatriate minority 
community share several of the features.”124  Note that neither the definition nor the 
listed features of diaspora require that members be geographically concentrated in the 
receiving country. 
Assimilation and integration represents a key ingredient to the occurrence of 
radicalization and terrorism in the Muslim diaspora.  For the purpose of this examination, 
assimilation is defined as “the process of absorbing or taking on the cultural values, 
attitudes, and behaviors of another cultural group.”125  Assimilation, however, does not 
require absorption of all cultural behaviors.  It is clear that it is possible to retain some of 
the original cultural values while adapting the accepted norms, behaviors, and traditions 
of another cultural group.  Similarly, it is not enough to suggest that integration is just the 
root opposite of segregation.  Although it is not specifically defined, migration literature 
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suggests that integration is a result of institutional and informal policies that provide a 
particular minority race, religion, culture, or ethnicity avenues of social and political 
participation within a receiving society, thereby decreasing the propensity for separate 
concentrations of communities to be cut off from state welfare, education, and social 
services.126   
A condition that terrorism scholars tend to agree on revolves around the 
individual’s social and political detachment during his adolescence and the subsequent 
development of interpersonal networks among the more politically active.127  Though 
Peter Waldman places much of his focus on constructing ideal-types of terrorist 
organizations, his assertions on social and political detachment are noteworthy.  The 
internal void left by the social and political detachment from an individual’s origins 
might be filled by a new collective group identity.  A brief look at the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) and Spain’s Basque Euskadi ta-Askatun (ETA) will illustrate the importance 
of political and social detachment. 
Both the IRA and ETA show strong signs of the process by which an individual 
experiences social and political detachment from his origins and a subsequent attachment 
to a more politically active social network.  Members of the IRA and ETA experience 
this detachment by feeling compelled to fight for the liberation of the ethnic population 
they are associated with and believe it to be suffering from repression.  Following the 
individual’s detachment and subsequent re-attachment to a more politically active social 
network, the bonds of friendship go hand-in-hand with increased political cohesion.  
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evolved together.128  The same could be said for members of ETA, whom undoubtedly 
enjoyed strong friendship ties that were closely associated to the cultural and social clubs 
from which ETA primarily recruited.129 
Cohen’s first and third characteristics of diasporas are important conditions to the 
process social and political detachment.130  The trauma accompanied by the dispersal 
from an original centre coupled with the memory of a great historic injustice detaches 
individuals from the society in the host country.  Since members of a diaspora within a 
receiving country believe they are not fully accepted in their host societies, that feeling of 
detachment is exacerbated, leaving a void susceptible to exploitation and a propensity for 
a subsequent reattachment to more politically active and radical social networks 
elsewhere in the diaspora. 
The experience of detachment from the host society, felt by members of an 
expatriate minority, is often worsened by the failure to include them in the political 
decision-making process.  In Europe, lack of integration and assimilation of Muslims is 
linked to the perceived failure of thirty years of social policies being designed without 
their input or participation in the policymaking process.131  From the individual 
perspective, lack of opportunity for political participation, coupled with a reattachment to 
a more politically-active radical social network—possibly, one that is already gravitating 
towards a clandestine existence—simply opens the aperture for that individual to resort to 
political violence. 
The experience of social and political detachment from the receiving society and 
the subsequent re-attachment to more politically active social networks pre-stages the 
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necessary condition to engage in political activism and participate in political conflicts.  
While members of a particular diaspora living in one place might be subject to a different 
political context than members of the same diaspora living in an entirely different part of 
the world, the condition that creates the propensity for radicalization is practically 
uniform.  With a reattachment to a more politically-active social network, the bonds of 
friendship formed among members of the social network begin to go hand-in-hand with 





Figure 7.   Radicalization Process Summary 
In sum, most terrorism scholars tend to agree that the making of a terrorist is a 
process.132  John Horgan states, “a person does not become a terrorist overnight … there 
is undeniably a gradual learning process that appears to typify involvement in 
terrorism.”133  In the context of diasporas, the formation of friendship bonds within a 
politically-active radical social network in conjunction with an increased sense of 
political cohesion provides outlets from Cohen’s first and third features of diasporas.  The 
individual’s new affiliations provide a coping mechanism to help deal with the memory of 
a great historic injustice and lack of acceptance by the receiving society.  Moreover, 
there is a degree of empowerment that the individual feels that gives him the sense that he 
can defend himself from the injustice and return everything to the way it once was, or 
perhaps ought to be, in the near future. 
Ethnic, cultural and religious identity also represents a key ingredient to the 
occurrence of radicalization and terrorism in diaspora.  Similar to the experience of 
political and social detachment from the host society, the experience of losing one’s 
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identity shapes both perceptions and attitudes among members of diaspora.  As 
previously discussed, the experience of social and political detachment reflects the first 
and third features of Cohen’s characterization of diasporas.  Ethnic, cultural, and 
religious identity is a close reflection of the second, fourth, fifth and sixth characteristics.  
This portion of the analysis will examine the extent that ethnic, cultural and religious 
identity plays a role in providing a condition conducive to radicalization and terrorism in 
diaspora. 
In the second feature, Cohen suggests that diasporas retain a collective memory, 
vision or myth about their original homeland.  This infers that members of a diaspora 
retain strong memories of that which makes them identify with a particular place.  
Examples include shared opinions and beliefs, tastes, ethnicities and religions, cuisine, 
the consumption of medicines, lifestyles, fashions, music, and dance.134  In refugee 
literature, it is clear that some refugees do recreate their home communities that they left 
behind.135  The elements of their ethnic, cultural, and religious identity follow members 
of diaspora to the place of re-settlement.  This helps maintain a sense of cultural 
continuity. 
Cohen’s sixth feature of diaspora states that members of a diaspora continue in 
various ways to relate to that homeland, and their ethno-communal consciousness and 
solidarity are defined by the existence of such a relationship.  From this, the elements of 
identity often clash with the elements that define the ethnic, cultural, and religious 
identity in the receiving countries.  This infers that identity must not be treated as a 
separate condition that is mutually exclusive of integration.  In fact, the two concepts play 
off each other and are closely related to the phenomenon of radicalization and terrorism 
in diaspora. 
The clash in identities appears most prevalent in host societies where the ethnic, 
cultural and religious traditions are in sharp contrast to the ethnic, cultural and religious 
identities shared by members of the diaspora.  For example, as briefly mentioned in the 
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introduction, a particular notion of anxiety is felt in the Muslim world in the manner it 
frames the West, just as a notion of anxiety is felt by the West in the manner it frames 
Muslims, Islamism, and extremism.  This anxiety translates into a feeling of being 
threatened by the other, and transcends into the idea that there exists some kind of 
existential struggle between the West and the Muslim world.  These perspectives 
highlight that, as members of diaspora struggle to retain their ethno-communal 
consciousness and solidarity, they are often met with resistance by the receiving society 
and that resistance might exacerbate the extent to which a member of a diaspora may feel 
he must defend himself or the community he believes to represent. 
As Horgan suggests, and many of the terrorism scholars agree, radicalization is a 
gradual process.  Once radicalization takes hold within an individual, identity plays an 
important role in the propensity for an individual to turn to terrorism.  Within the new 
politically active and radical social network, there is the perception that their identity is 
threatened by the host society and, as a result, members of diaspora that are affiliated 
with these politically-active social networks might feel as if they must defend their 
identity and take action to re-establish what they believe was unjustly taken from them.   
Cohen’s fourth and fifth features of diaspora also help qualify this claim.  The 
fourth characteristic of diaspora states that the ancestral home is idealized and it is 
thought that, when conditions are favorable, either they, or their descendants should 
return; the fifth states that they believe all members of the diaspora should be committed 
to the maintenance or restoration of the original homeland and to its safety and 
prosperity, and in some cases, even the very creation of an imagined homeland.  An 
individual who has become radicalized views his ethnic, cultural, and religious identity as 
an extension of his homeland, which are all perceived to be under attack.  Thus, the 
individual is susceptible to the use of political violence as a means to ensure the 
restoration, safety, and security of his homeland. 
Finally, it is not clear as to the extent that the conditions presented in both 
hypotheses related.  However, it does appear as if they are not entirely separate and do in 
fact intersect.  Thus, integration and assimilation must not be viewed as conditions that 
are mutually exclusive of the role of identity in radicalization and terrorism as they are in 
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part related to each other.  The connection is inherent to Cohen’s sixth feature of diaspora 
where the success of assimilation and integration partially hinges on the extent of the 
clash in identities between the members of the diaspora and their receiving society.   
In sum, there are two key ingredients to the occurrence of radicalization and 
terrorism in diaspora.  First, assimilation and integration represent a necessary condition 
to the occurrence of radicalization and terrorism in diaspora because of the experience of 
political and social detachment from the host society felt by members of an expatriate 
minority.  This condition has a direct impact on the process of an individual’s 
radicalization.  Second, ethnic, cultural and religious identity also represent a condition to 
the occurrence of radicalization and terrorism in diaspora.  An individual who has 
become radicalized views his ethnic, cultural, and religious identity as an extension of his 
homeland, which are all perceived to be under attack.  As a result, members of diaspora 
that are affiliated with politically-active social networks might feel as if they must defend 
their identity and take action to re-establish what they believe was unjustly taken from 
them.   
a. Case Study: Radicalization of Somali Muslims in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota 
Each of the two conditions, or key ingredients, to radicalization and 
terrorism in diaspora argued in this analysis contain enough support from the literature 
pertaining to the broader topics of terrorism and migration.  As a quality control, it is 
important to attempt to identify the presence of these conditions in actual diaspora 
communities where members have radicalized and turned to terrorism.  This will help 
illustrate the implications of the two conditions. Therefore, the final portion of this 
analysis will test these conclusions against a case study of members of Somali diaspora 
living in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, is home to one of the largest concentrations of 
Somali immigrants and refugees living in the United States.  According to various federal 
immigration resources, Somali refugees began arriving in the United States in the early 
1990s.  During that time, Somalia struggled in violent mayhem as a result of the collapse 
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of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.136  “The collapse resulted in a descent into factional 
fighting and anarchy, especially in Southern Somalia.”137  The total number of Somalis 
who live in Minneapolis, including the proportion of Somalis who are foreign born and 
non-citizens, foreign born naturalized citizens, or native born, is unclear today.138  
However, the most credible reports available suggest that there are anywhere between 
70,000 and 200,000 Somalis living in Minneapolis.139 
There is no agreement on exactly when or how they emerged, but it was 
sometime during this period that Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin, or The Youth, formed as a 
major militant force fighting for control in Somalia.140  Al-Shabaab became a powerful 
and important armed element of the Islamic Courts Union (a governing Islamic council of 
Sharia law) that gained control of South/Central Somalia and was the major source 
feeding the insurgency against the Ethiopian forces that invaded Somalia in December 
2006.141  Like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab wages jihad against the enemies of Islam and seeks 
to adapt its own Salafi-Wahhabi governance.142  Unlike Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab appears 
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believes Al-Shabaab has close ties to Al-Qaeda and designated Al-Shabaab, which 
apparently has at least fifteen other surnames, a terrorist organization in February 
2008.144 
Between the years of 1996 and 2008, in a series of separate instances, an 
alleged sixteen young men of Somali descent suddenly disappeared from their local 
communities in Minneapolis.  These communities are primarily composed of members of 
the large Somali diaspora that eventually settled in Minneapolis.  One of these young 
men, Shirwa Ahmed, a college student in his late twenties, blew himself up in Somalia in 
one of five simultaneous bombings.145  “The coordinated attacks were executed against 
local government, Ethiopian, and UN compounds in the northern Somali polities of 
Puntland and Somaliland.”146  This became the central focus for federal law enforcement 
officials investigating the possibility of Al-Shabaab or similar organizations recruiting in 
the United States. 
Some members of the Somali diaspora living in Minneapolis testified to 
their experiences with the conflict in Somalia.  In March 2009, the community director at 
the Brian Coyle Center of Pillsbury United Communities, a central community center for 
the Somali community living in the Minneapolis metropolitan area, testified on the 
concern for radicalization among Somali youth in the Minneapolis area.  Like so many 
Somalis who reside in Minneapolis, Abdirahman Mukhtar was a refugee from war-torn 
Somalia.  He said the following: 
My name is Abdirahman Mukhtar. I was born in Somalia. I fled 
Muqdisho, the capital city of Somalia, when the civil war started early 
January 1991 and went to a refugee camp in Liboa, Kenya. I stayed seven 
years in refugee camps and the capital city of Nairobi, Kenya. I moved to 
the United States in August of 1998.  The main difficulty I had  
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assimilating to the mainstream community was the language barrier…I 
experienced racial and cultural misunderstandings [and had] limited 
formal education.147 
Mukhtar’s testimony underplays the severity of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.  The 
most recent reports from UNRWA claim that there are more than 530,000 Somali 
refugees scattered across the globe.148  Hundreds of thousands more are IDPs in Somalia 
fleeing the conflict and perhaps hundreds of thousands more in a state of humanitarian 
crisis that the UN may not even recognize under its current definitions and policies.  
Moreover, aid cannot get where it needs to go.  “In 2008, one third of all humanitarian 
casualties worldwide occurred in Somalia, making it the most dangerous place on Earth 
for aid workers.”149  These facts are an important background narrative to Mukhtar’s 
opening remarks. 
Though Abdirahman Mukhtar underplays the seriousness of the political 
violence that is impacting the Somali diaspora, his statement highlights the implications 
surrounding the first key ingredient to radicalization and terrorism in diaspora: 
assimilation and integration.  Because the situation in Somalia is a protracted crisis, many 
of the individuals fleeing the region have very little education and have almost no 
English-speaking skills.  According to testimony by the Deputy Director of the NCTC, 
“their relative linguistic isolation and the sudden adjustment to American society many 
refugees faced has reinforced, in some areas, their greater insularity compared to other, 
more integrated Muslim immigrant communities, and has aggravated the challenges of 
assimilation for their children.”150 
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Ethnic, cultural and religious identity, which represents another key 
ingredient to radicalization and terrorism in diaspora, is also a factor in the detachment 
process.  Every key witness cited a sense among the youth of being caught between two 
worlds, a phrase often attributed to a deep conflict in identity.  The director went on to 
state that the Somali youth in Minneapolis often feel “torn between their parents’ 
traditional ethnic, tribal, and clan identities and the new cultures and traditions offered by 
American society.”151  Without institutions to balance and properly guide these young 
men in such a way as to overcome this obstacle, like any other internal conflict among 
youth, it simply manifests itself in ways that can pose dangerous consequences in later 
years. 
The director’s remarks, and the conclusions that can be inferred from 
those remarks, are also supported in Mukhtar’s testimony.  He claims that the language 
barrier worsens the racial, cultural, and religious misunderstandings between native 
residents and Somalis.152  The assimilation and integration problem also extends to the 
classroom.  “Somali students like me were enrolled into classrooms in the United States 
based on age rather than academic level, making it very difficult to succeed. When 
classes are challenging beyond a person’s current capability, it often leads to students 
skipping school and dropping out.”153  Moreover, gangs and drugs are tempting outlets 
for the Somali youth, who lack role models, structure, and direction.  Economic and 
social mobility is on the far distant horizon as “Somali families for the most part live in 
high density housing in the lowest income neighborhoods in the City.”154  Poor social 
integration, little to no feelings of acceptance into the receiving society, and almost a 
complete absence of assimilation among younger members of the Somali diaspora in 
Minneapolis opens the divergence between these young Somalis and their host society. 
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b. Hypothesis One Summary 
The analysis, thus far, confirms my first hypothesis of the 
counterproductive nature of profiling in CT-operations.  First, there is a close relationship 
of assimilation and integration to the likelihood of social and political detachment from a 
receiving society.  Second, ethnic, cultural and religious identity conflicts deepen the 
sense of detachment and leave an individual, especially one who is young and lacks 
guidance, direction, structure, and role models, susceptible to the misgivings of radical 
Islamic recruiters who are seeking personnel to participate in their cause.  Expert 
witnesses on the incidents of radicalization among young Somali men clearly illustrate 
the experience of social and political detachment from the receiving society and the 
subsequent re-attachment to more politically active social networks.  As Director 
Liepman of the NCTC argues: 
Sophisticated extremist recruiters target vulnerable individuals who lack 
structure and definition in their lives, by offering what parents and 
outsiders often view as a seemingly innocuous alternative to more 
common violent subcultures associated with gangs and criminality.155 
Accordingly, I argue that the social and political detachment that these young men might 
be experiencing pre-stages the necessary condition to engage in political activism and 
participate in political conflicts. 
Profiling of Muslims—either real or perceived, therefore, increases the 
extent to which members of the Muslim diaspora feel marginalized or in a state of 
isolation from their receiving society vis-à-vis the United States.  The unintended 
consequence of a technique such as profiling denigrates Muslims to the point as being 
perceived by the receiving society as socially unacceptable, disloyal and untrustworthy 
constituents.  The same may be said for the political isolation of the Muslim diaspora.  
Coupled with the broad perception that Muslims are subversively acting to undermine the 
U.S. and its interests, including plots to overthrow the U.S. government, the political 
marginalization is severe.  The consequences of political marginalization multiply the 
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amplitude of the socially-isolating forces already at play.  The end-state of both the social 
and political detachment from U.S. society is an entire community that fails to assimilate 
and, therefore, leaves the aperture for the continued recruitment efforts of Islamic 
extremist networks wide-open. 
2. The Grand Strategy of Islamic Terrorist Organizations 
Many argue that profiling of Muslims is a practical response to the threat of 
Islamic terrorism.  In 2003, Heather Mac Donald stated in her widely acclaimed book, 
Are Cops Racist? “if we concentrate our investigation on Middle-Eastern Muslims, we 
are not playing the odds: we are following the terrorists’ own self-definition.”156  Mac 
Donald was not arguing that police should begin a focused campaign against the Muslim 
population, but suggesting that systems such as the Computer Assisted Passenger 
Profiling System (CAPPS) start using ethnicity and national origin as predictors of 
Islamic terrorism, rather than simply using indicators such as paying cash for tickets and 
buying one-way tickets, indicators that Islamic terrorists can easily bypass.157  The 
objectives and strategy of Islamic terrorism, however, suggest that the technique is 
actually counterproductive.   
The logic behind my second hypothesis for the counterproductive nature of 
profiling follows from an understanding of the grand strategy of Islamic terrorist groups.  
Part of the grand strategy of Islamic terrorists is to isolate the United States, and its allies, 
from the rest of the World.  One objective in such a strategy is to portray the United 
States as a hotbed of racism and injustice.  My second hypothesis is: 
A policy that advocates the arbitrary use of ethnic and religious profiling 
—whether real or perceived—alienates individuals of Muslim identity, 
which plays directly into the strategy of Islamic terrorist organizations by 
portraying the United States as fundamentally racist and willing to 
arbitrarily forego its own democratic principles. 
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Even the perception of ethnic profiling leaves a lasting impression that the United States 
is willing to arbitrarily forego its own democratic values.  The consequence is that 
Muslims and non-Muslims will grow farther apart in beliefs, values, and the manner in 
which they view and trust each other.  Moreover, should support for the United States 
weaken, the isolation strategy could potentially appear successful. 
Islamic extremist groups cleverly and patiently focus their efforts on undermining 
the global legitimacy of the United States.  They understand and use the media to alter 
cultures of personality, they use elaborate surprise and deception tactics, sophisticated 
recruiting methods, and intricately blend religion, politics and law in an extremely 
volatile social discourse.  Their hierarchical structures are unfixed, moving from 
centralized organizational configurations to disenfranchised, “leaderless jihad” 
networks.158  Efforts of Islamic extremists are designed to target three very specific 
centers of gravity: international alliances, domestic and international public opinion, and 
the fragile balance of ethnic relations—primarily in the United States, but also in Europe 
and Great Britain.  Striking the right chords in each of these centers of gravity not only 
isolates the United States, but upsets a very fragile balance of domestic and international 
ethnic relations. 
a. International Alliances and Domestic and International Public 
Opinion 
There are several examples of Islamic terrorist organizations, such as Al-
Qaeda, planning their targets as a means of cutting off the United States’ support in the 
GWOT from its allies and targeting public opinion against the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  A few examples will suffice to make the point apparent.  One example is 
the suicide bombings that took place on several trains in Madrid, Spain.  On March 11, 
2004, four commuter trains arriving in central Madrid exploded in a near-simultaneous 
attack, which killed 191 people.159  The attacks are reported to be inspired by Al-Qaeda, 
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but without direction from the group.160  Less than one month later, as police prepared to 
conduct a raid in response to the attacks, seven suspects of the attack blew themselves up 
in an apartment, which also took the life of one police officer.161  Many argue that the 
attacks were just enough to sway public opinion in opposition to the U.S.-led campaign 
and bolster support for the election of Prime Minister Zapatero, who quickly withdrew 
Spanish troops from Iraq in a move widely applauded by Spanish citizens.162  
Another example is the four suicide bombings, perpetrated by British 
citizens—all Muslims—on the London transit system on July 7, 2005 (7/7).  Three of the 
bombings occurred in the underground subway, and one on a bus.  The attack killed 56 
people and injured nearly 700.163  The alleged leader of the small group that murdered 52 
people on 7/7, Mohammed Siddique Khan, planned the killings out of anger over the 
UK’s foreign policy, specifically, attributing the attacks to the UK’s involvement in the 
U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq.164  Both attacks appear to have been aimed at 
demonstrating to both the political representation and the constituencies that support for 
the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is unjustified and will jeopardize the 
safety of innocent civilians.  The UK remains a key ally in the U.S.’s efforts to prevent 
terrorism.  Spain, however, was heavily criticized by the U.S. for being perceived as 
giving in to the Islamic terrorist strategy by withdrawing its troops from Iraq soon after 
the train bombings.165  Even with the criticism, the attacks appeared to have an enormous 
effect on public opinion in Spain, which might have completely altered the course of their 
elections. 
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b. Ethnic Relations 
In addition to targeting international alliances and public opinion, Islamic 
terrorists also target the fragile balance of ethnic relations.  Islamic terrorists understand 
the influence that ethnic relations can have on an entire nation’s social and political 
discourse.  Islamic terrorists can capitalize on the resulting social and political 
disharmony by using it to advance and qualify its own recruiting propaganda.  Moreover, 
Islamic terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda capitalize on the social and political 
disharmony by “exploiting ordinary people’s grievances and manipulating them into 
becoming terrorists.”166  Essentially, Al-Qaeda’s manipulation of ethnic tensions is 
potentially used to obtain leadership and control “over all other extremist movements in 
order to unify it into one single movement.”167  Al-Qaeda’s attack on a sacred Shiite 
shrine in Iraq exemplifies the assertion that Islamic terrorist groups selectively choose 
targets to upset delicate ethnic relations and use that discord to their advantage. 
On February 22, 2006, the Askariya mosque in Samarra, Iraq was bombed 
by Al-Qaeda in Iraq.  Almost immediately, Shiites took to the streets of Baghdad, about 
60 miles south of Samarra.  Shiite protestors launched attacks against dozens of Sunni 
mosques, killing several Sunni Imams.168  Sectarian violence erupted as a result of the 
bombing of the Golden Dome, and blame often pointed to the U.S. occupation, giving 
fuel to anti-U.S. sentiment in Iraq.  By the end of 2006, 350 mosques had been targeted in 
sectarian conflict in Iraq, three times that of 2005.169  Not only was Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
aiming to start a civil war in Iraq, but they used the attack to unify opposition against the 
United States and advance its message in order to spread the reach of their organization.  
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3. Connecting the Dots 
Arguments about the legality and even morality of profiling appear to be off the 
mark when it comes to preventing terrorism.  By looking at profiling in greater context of 
identity and the nature of Islamic terrorism, it is possible to illustrate that however 
compelling it may be as a tool, the effects can actually hinder our efforts to disrupt 
terrorism.  My analysis is not attempting to liken profiling to terrorist attacks.  Instead, I 
am attempting to show that Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda are clever 
opportunists, working to divide and isolate the United States in any way possible.  An 
analysis of my two hypotheses regarding the counterproductive nature of profiling 
Muslims demonstrates the true essence of the “Catch-22” effect as it pertains to the use of 
profiling in CT-operations.   
My two hypotheses are not exclusive of each other.  In many ways, the second 
operates from the first: Alienation of ethnic and religious identity not only exacerbates 
the conditions that lead to incipient radicalization, but portrays the United States as racist 
and unjust, which fundamentally isolates the U.S. from the Muslim world, essentially 
creating two worlds in violent opposition to each other, both on the domestic and 
international fronts.  Ethnic or religious profiling merely exacerbates these conditions, 
which appears to play directly into the strategy of Islamic terrorist organizations.  The 
next section will illustrate that each time Muslims were exposed for supporting terrorism, 
ethnic profiling does not appear to have been a factor in disrupting such plots. 
B. ROLE OF PROFILING IN DISRUPTING TERRORIST PLOTS 
What is not often discussed in the debate on whether profiling Muslims is 
justified or effective is that, even if a policy were implemented that arbitrarily targeted 
Muslims, profiling Muslims in the U.S. would not be an easy task.  How does anyone 
distinguish Muslim from non-Muslim?  The Pew Research Center noted in 2007 that 
Muslims are the most racially-diverse religious group in America, as one in three are 
white, one in four are black, one in five are Asian, and the remaining 19% (just less than 
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one in five) are of other races.170  Of course, targeting mosques seems to be the method 
that seems more resourceful, and that also appears to be the source of many of the 
complaints by the Muslim community.  On individual appearances, it seems simple to 
“spot” a Muslim when appearances follow the traditional stereotype, for example: Arab 
men dressed in traditional garments, displaying beards, speaking Arabic, praying together 
and making comments about the U.S. in Iraq.  Even this rationale is flawed, as it suggests 
that all Muslims will fit into that profile.  It appears, however, that such rationale does 
seem to play a role in deciding who “might be” a danger to society. 
Perhaps the most often cited instance of profiling Muslims at airports comes from 
the case now known as “flying while Muslim,” also referred to as the Six Imams Case.  
Officially cited as Shqeirat et al. v. U.S. Airways Group, the case details an incident 
where in 2006, six passengers of a U.S. Airways flight were removed and detained by 
law enforcement officers on grounds of displaying unusual and strange behavior that was 
considered by the flight crew as detrimental to safety.171  As the aircraft prepared for 
takeoff, a passenger passed a note to one of the flight attendants, the note stated: 
6 suspicious Arabic men on plane, spaced out in their seats. All were 
together, saying “.....Allah......Allah,” cursing U.S. involvement w/ 
Saddam before flight—1 in front exit row, another in first row 1st class, 
another in 8D, another in 22D, two in 25 E&F.172 
Lawyers for the defendants argued that U.S. Airway’s decision to remove the six 
passengers was justified under the Federal Aviation Act.173  The motion to dismiss the 
case was denied, with the opinion of the Court ultimately going in favor of the 
plaintiffs.174   This case is used as the figurehead for what many refer to as Islamophobia, 
                                                 
170 Pew Research Center. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape 
Survey (Washington, D.C., February 2008), 44. 
171 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) states that an air carrier may refuse to transport a 
passenger or property that the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety. 
172 Text of US Airway’s motion for Summary Judgment in Shqeirat et al v. U.S. Airways Group, 
INC., et al, on the CAIR Web site, available at http://www.flyingwhilemuslim.org/images/pdf/011-
05.29.07-memo-of-law-in-support-of-msj.pdf (accessed October 20, 2009). 
173 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) states that an air carrier may refuse to transport a 
passenger or property that the carrier decides is, or might be, inimical to safety. 
174 Council on American-Islamic Relations, “CAIR Hails 'Major Victory' in Six Imams Civil Rights 
Case.” Science Letter, August 11, 2009, available at http://www.proquest.com (accessed October 28, 2009).  
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suggesting that it appears that this case is more of a case of fear and suspicion of Muslims 
than a systematic and methodical screening approach that tools such as CAPPS provide.   
As it happens, CAPPS did undergo an overhaul.  In 2003, the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) took massive steps to improve the original CAPPS 
protocols.175   The TSA sought to enhance airport screening measures in a new screening 
system called CAPPS II, which is now more commonly referred to as Secure Flight.  The 
new system has the capability of merging passenger records, which in CAPPS I was 
limited to name, flight reservation date, flight information and payment method, with 
data stored in databanks maintained by private companies.176  Such data typically 
contains address, phone number, date of birth, and social security number.177  The Secure 
Flight capability is designed to cross-reference passenger records with terrorist 
watchlists.  The idea is that by using personally-identifiable information, such as an 
individual’s date of birth, the new pre-screening system can reduce the passenger 
mismatches, i.e., a matching record to a record contained in the TSC’s watchlist based on 
a name with the same spelling can now be discriminated with date of birth to minimize 
errors.178  The date of birth indicator can discriminate between the passenger record 
being screened by Secure Flight and the record contained in the terrorist watchlist. 
Framed from the perspective of passenger profiling, it appears that Secure Flight 
does not incorporate discriminating indicators such as ethnicity or religion.  Moreover, it 
appears that the Secure Flight system actually reduces the likelihood of a situation where 
an innocent individual is detained by authorities because he or she had the same name of 
an individual on the TSC’s terrorist watchlist.  Even with the new changes, which were 
fully implemented in 2006, complaints by Muslims that they are being unfairly treated, or 
profiled, in airports persist. 
                                                 
175 TSA’s new measures to improve CAPPS were a result of the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107–71, § 136, 115 Stat. 597, 636C37 (2001). 
176 GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully Disclose Uses of 
Personal Information during Secure Flight Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has Recently 
Taken Steps to More Fully Inform the Public (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005), 3. 
177 Ibid. 
178 United States. Congress. House, Improving Pre-Screening of Aviation Passengers Against 
Terrorist And Other Watch Lists, Subcommittee on Economic Security, infrastructure Protection and Cyber 
security of the Committee on homeland Security, Serial No. 109-27, June 29, 2005, 15–16. 
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Airports are not the only venue in which Muslims feel they are being profiled.  
Subways, train stations, and major sporting events represent venues that often involve 
random searches, which are sometimes perceived by some Muslims as targeting people 
who look or appear Muslim.  In each of these cases, the security policies in place seem to 
point towards other indicators to identify individuals who might be engaged in subversive 
activity.  For example, an individual who is sweating profusely, repeatedly checking self, 
making irregular glances from side-to-side, and possibly carrying a large object better fits 
the profile of an individual who might be preparing to conduct an attack.179  In sum, it 
appears that complaints of profiling continue, but it does not appear that there are any 
formal policies or systems that advocate the use of a technique of arbitrarily profiling 
Muslims under the assumption or stereotype that terrorists tend to be Muslim.  In an in-
depth review of several disrupted terrorist plots in the U.S. following 9/11, specifically in 
cases where the suspects are Muslims, it also does not appear that profiling was used by 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies to prevent the intended attacks. 
1. Foiled Islamic Terrorist Plots Post-9/11 
In July 2009, the Heritage Foundation released a report that provides a brief 
description of 23 different terrorist plots against the U.S. since 9/11.  The Heritage 
Foundation report is not an all-inclusive review; it is essentially a brief summary of the 
plot descriptions and the suspects involved.  I examined 12 of the 23 plots by conducting 
an in-depth survey of the literature related to each of the plots.  The goal of such an 
examination is to identify or determine the extent that profiling, in any form, played a 
role in the disruption of the plots.  The major finding can be summarily described in one 
statement: there does not appear to be any evidence, at least none that is available in the 
public domain, that indicates that profiling, in any form, was used by law enforcement 
and intelligence officials to initiate investigations, nor does profiling appear to be used in 
any way to disrupt any of the plots.  A detailed table of the plots, to include suspects, the 
                                                 
179 Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), “Terrorism Warnings: Suspicious 
Terrorist Activities,” on the MIPT Web site, available at http://www.mipt.org/mipt-terrorism-warnings--
indicators-card (accessed August 23, 2009). 
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intended targets, the nature of the attacks or plan and the key factors initiating the 
investigation of the individuals in question is presented in Tables 2–5.180 
Of all the post-9/11 plots that have been foiled, the Lackawanna Six 
investigations seem to invoke the most criticism for profiling.181  According to FBI 
Agent Ed Needham of the FBI Buffalo Field Office, the investigation began as the six 
men were in Afghanistan, when an anonymous letter from Lackawanna's Yemeni 
community arrived at the Buffalo FBI field offices, stating that the men went to “meet bin 
Laden and stay in his camp.”182  This indicates that, in the case of the Lackawanna Six, 
profiling did not play a role in the prompting the investigations into the activities of the 
suspects.183  
It appears that of the 12 plots examined, law enforcement agencies initiated only 
two of the investigations based on tips to either local law enforcement or the FBI.  The 
Virginia Jihad Network was brought down from a thorough investigation into the reach 
of the Saudi-Wahhabi and Salafi extremist recruiting that is taking place within the 
United States.  The “Shoe-Bomber” was stopped in the act, and the details of the incident 
suggest that Richard Reid was not profiled, in any form; rather, he was prevented from 
doing harm by the intervention of attentive passengers and flight crew.  In other 
instances, several of the plots were discovered during the investigation and interrogation 
of high-profile Al-Qaeda operatives arrested overseas.  A survey of the remaining 11  
 
 
                                                 
180 Jena Baker and Jay Carafano, “Terrorist Watch: 23 Plots Foiled Since 9/11,The Heritage 
Foundation, Backgrounder, no. 2294, (July 2, 2009).  Because the report is not all-inclusive, a broad survey 
of open source information is necessary to compile the necessary data to present the findings.  Therefore, 
unless otherwise referenced, individual cell data was obtained from The Heritage Foundation report. 
181 Neighbors of the six suspects complained that, “this was racial profiling…We know these boys. 
They are just like us. We watch them play soccer. We pray with them. We know their parents and their 
brothers and sisters and wives. If these six are suspects, then so is everyone else.”  Excerpt from text of 
Dina Temple-Raston, “The Jihad Next Door,” on the NPS Web site, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14285994 (accessed October 28, 2009). 
182 Text of the transcript of "Chasing the Sleeper Cell," a video documentary on the Lackawanna Six 
terror probe, on the PBS Web site, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/etc/script.html (accessed October 28, 2009). 
183 Jena Baker and Jay Carafano, “Terrorist Watch: 23 Plots Foiled Since 9/11,The Heritage 
Foundation, Backgrounder, no. 2294, (July 2, 2009).  Unless otherwise referenced, individual cell data 
obtained from The Heritage Foundation report. 
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plots not presented in this analysis also indicates that profiling was not used by law 
enforcement either to prompt the investigation of the activities of the suspects or disrupt 
the plot. 








Detonate Explosive in 
Shoe 
Al-Qaeda184 Caught in the act by flight crew 
and passengers as he tried to 








Plot to detonate 
radiological "dirty 
bomb" 
Al-Qaeda185 Believed that captive terrorist 
leaders discussed information 


















Collapse the bridge 
using blowtorches, & 
derailing train in D.C. 
in simultaneous attacks 
Al-Qaeda Faris' identity discovered during 
either the interrogation of 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
(KSM) and search of his 
personal files and 
communications 189 
Table 2.   Analysis of Post-9/11 Terror Plots 
 
 
                                                 
184 Maria Ressa, "Sources: Reid Is Al-Qaeda Operative," December 6, 2003, on the CNN.com Web 
site, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/01/30/reid.alqaeda/ (accessed 
October 22, 2009). 
185 Tony Karon, "Person of the Week: Jose Padilla," June 14, 2002, on the Time.com Web site, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/pow/article/0,8599,262269,00.html (accessed October 22, 2009). 
186 Ibid. 
187 The Lackawanna Six members consist of Sahim Alwan, Yahya Goba, Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, 
Shafal Mosed, and Mukhtar al-Bakri, all American Citizens, all of Yemeni descent, see Heritage Report. 
188 Text of the written transcript of "Chasing the Sleeper Cell," a video documentary on the 
Lackawanna Six Terror Probe, on the PBS Web site, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/etc/script.html (accessed October 28, 2009). 
189 Peter Bergen, "Commentary: Cheney wrong on Interrogations," August, 31, 2009, on the 
CNN.com Web site, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/31/bergen.cheney/index.html?section=cnn_latest (accessed 
October 27, 2009). 
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Accused Year Target(s) Nature of 
Attack/Plans 




Jun-03 U.S. personnel in 
Afghanistan, 
undescribed targets in 
U.S. and India 
Violating 
Neutrality Acts 







Dhiren Barot et 
al192 
Aug-04 New York Stock 
Exchange, Bank 




and Citigroup as well 
as undisclosed targets 









Al-Qaeda See note.194 






                                                 
190 The Neutrality Acts prohibit American citizens and residents from attacking countries with which 
the United States is at peace, as the suspects also intended to strike in India. 
191 Federal investigators probe Wahhabi & Salafi extremist networks.  Probes in Idaho, Michigan, 
New York and Northern Virginian extended to internet, mosques, charities, Islamic conferences, and U.S. 
prisons as sources of recruiting efforts, al-Timimi, the spiritual leader of the Virginia Jihad Network was 
tied to Wahhabi-Salafi extremist groups, once al-Timimi was identified, his house was searched and his 
network and associates were identified.  From Susan Schmidt, "Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S.: 
Network of Wahhabi Mosques," October 2, 2003, on The Washington Post Web site, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A31402-2003Oct1?language=printer (accessed October 28, 
2009). 
192 At least seven other co-conspirators were charged in the UK: BBC News, "Man Admits Part in 
Terrorism Plot," April 30, 2007, on the BBC News Web site, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6608937.stm (accessed October 28, 2009). 
193 BBC News, "Man Admits UK-US Terror Bomb Plot," October 12, 2006, on the BBC News Web 
site, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6044938.stm (accessed October 28, 2009). 
194 UK authorities identify Barot,  suspect him of being a "significant" Al-Qaeda operative, Scotland 
Yard places Barot under surveillance (codenamed Operation Rhyme), Pakistani police raid Barot's house in 
Pakistan in July 2004, discovering plans on laptop computer and notebook detailing the plots. From The 
Guardian, "Barot Operation Posed Complex Challenge," November 7, 2006, on the guardian.co.uk Web 
site, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/nov/07/usa.terrorism (accessed October 28, 2009). 
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Accused Year Target(s) Nature of 
Attack/Plans 




















New York City Police 
Intelligence Division 
undercover detective, 
known as "Kamil Pasha" 
infiltrated the small group 





Aug-04 Pakistani diplomat shoulder-fired 






about Yassin Aref found in 
a bombed out encampment 
in Iraq, FBI begins 
surveillance, sting operation 
set-up by FBI, suspects 
lured into purchasing fake 
shoulder-fired grenades in a 





Aug-05 National Guard 
facilities, 
Synagogues, and 
other facilities in 
the Los Angeles 
area 










                                                 
195 Press Release, "Shahawar Matin Siraj Convicted of Conspiring to Place Explosives at the 24th 
Street Subway Station," U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York, May 24, 2006, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006may24.html (accessed October 28, 2009). 
196 Brendon Lyons, "Suspects Raise Domestic Spy Issue," January 5, 2006, on the Timesunion.com 
Web site, available at 
http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=436432&category=REGION&newsdate=1/5/20
06 (accessed October 28, 2009). 
197 One of the members, Haley Washington, was arrested for robbery 1 month prior to charging JIS 
with the plot; authorities subsequently searched Washington's apartment under suspicion of his 
involvement in a series of robberies that police thought were tied to prison or street gangs, the search turned 
up jihadist literature and evidence of a target list. See Greg Krikorian, "2 Men's Ties to Group of Extremists 
Investigated," on the Los Angeles Times Web site, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jul/15/local/me-arrests15 (accessed October 28, 2009). 
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Accused Year Target(s) Nature of 
Attack/Plans 
Connection(s) Factor Prompting 
Investigation 
Fort Dix Plot May-07 U.S. Army Base, Fort 












In Jan-06, an unidentified 
store clerk alerted police 
to a video that showed the 
men firing assault 
weapons, calling for jihad 
and yelling "God is great" 
in Arabic...the group 
submitted the video file to 
the store so that it could 
be copied onto a DVD198 
JFK Airport 
Plot: Russeel 
Defeitas et al 











There is no public 
information that states 
when U.S. authorities first 
learned of the plot, an 
informant was introduced 
to the investigation in 
2006, infiltrated the group 
and helped authorities 
gather evidence to 
prosecute in exchange for 
money and reduced 
sentencing.199 
Christopher Paul Jun-08 Americans at vacation 




Al-Qaeda Open source information 
is sketchy on exactly how 
the FBI got wind of Paul, 
but Paul had been 
working with Al-Qaeda 
since the 1990s and had 
associations with an 
Islamic fundamentalist 
that was arrested in 1993. 
It is likely that authorities 
picked up on his identity 
from a variety of 
confidential sources. 200 
Table 5.   Analysis of Post-9/11 Terror Plots (continued from Tables 2, 3, and 4) 
                                                 
198 Dale Russakoff and Dan Eggen, "Six Charged in Plot to Attack Fort Dix," May 9, 2007, on The 
Washington Post Web site, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/08/AR2007050800465.html (accessed October 28, 2009). 
199 The NEFA Foundation, "The John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport Plot," no.16 in Target 
America series, on the NEFA Foundation Web site, available at 
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefajfkplot1008.pdf (accessed October 28, 
2009). 
200 News release, “Ohio Man Sentenced to 20 Years for Terrorism Conspiracy to Bomb Targets in 
Europe and the United States,” Gregory C. Lockhart, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Ohio, February 
26, 2009, on the FBI Field Office Cincinnati Web site, available at 
http://cincinnati.fbi.gov/doj/pressrel/2009/ci022609.htm (accessed October 28, 2009). 
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2. Additional Observations 
One of the key take-aways from the above examination is that it is necessary to 
recognize that it is certainly possible that racial bias in people may have been a large 
factor in deciding to act on their suspicion in contacting law enforcement to inform them 
that they believe they witnessed a suspicious act.  In the context of the 23 foiled terrorist 
plots against the United States, this may only be the case in the Fort Dix case.  Disrupting 
the plans in the other cases seems to have stemmed from investigative leads obtained 
through tracing social networks, undercover agents who infiltrate small radical groups, 
interrogations of terrorists captured overseas, and other anonymous tips.   
Because suspicion of Muslims and fear of the violent Islamic quest to undermine 
or overthrow the U.S. government in society is clearly evident, this thesis recognizes that 
such suspicion and fear catalyzes racial bias, which might manifest in different ways.  
One way such fear and suspicion may manifest itself is when non-Muslims gravitate 
towards observing people that appear Muslim, to include prompting people to call in tips 
to law enforcement about suspicious activity on the part of individuals who look Muslim.  
One area of the literature calls this cognitive bias.201  In the context of profiling, whether 
it is in law enforcement for crime control or counterterrorism for preventing terrorism, 
cognitive bias is “an overestimation of the likelihood that members of a racial category 
will act in accordance with such alleged core traits as criminal activity.”202  There is, 
however, no clear evidence of cognitive bias playing a role in any of the 23 cases.  An 
argument for cognitive bias might be made in the Fort Dix case because the store clerk 
saw a video of Muslim men firing guns yelling “God is great!” in Arabic.  It is possible 
that a cognitive association involving bias towards events involving Islamic terrorism 
played a role in prompting the store clerk to notify the authorities.  One might also 
                                                 
201 Cognitive bias is an implicit process that results from the cognitive process of categorization, such 
categorization can lead individuals to overemphasize certain core traits of the individual categories. See 
Alex C. Geisinger, “Rethinking Profiling: A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications” (March, 
27 2009). Oregon Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, 2007; Drexel College of Law Research Paper No. 2009-A-
04, available at SSRN Web site at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369288 (accessed October 28, 2009). 
202 Alex C. Geisinger, “Rethinking Profiling: A Cognitive Model of Bias and Its Legal Implications” 
(March, 27 2009). Oregon Law Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, 2007; Drexel College of Law Research Paper No. 
2009-A-04, available at SSRN Web site at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369288 (accessed October 28, 2009), 
658. 
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qualify an argument for cognitive bias in the Lackawanna Six case, but the letter that the 
FBI received contained specific details about the suspects, suggesting that the tip most 
likely came from someone who knew them well.  Nevertheless, I recognize that cognitive 
bias might exist, even in law enforcement officers, but the findings of my survey detailed 
in Chapter V suggest that law enforcement officers have dozens of visual and behavioral 
indicators other than race, ethnicity or religion that they rely on in their rationale for 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Racial, ethnic, or religious profiling appears not have played any role in the actual 
disruption of terrorist plots.  Moreover, the previous chapter also highlights that framing 
profiling in greater context, such as issues of identity, assimilation and integration, and 
the strategy and objectives of Islamic terrorist organizations, indicates that profiling 
Muslims works against an effective long-term CT-strategy.  It does so for two reasons: 
First, ethnic profiling exacerbates the identity gaps between Muslim and non-Muslim, 
alienating the former and making the condition of social and political detachment more of 
a likelihood; second, ethnic profiling actually portrays the U.S. as fundamentally racist 
and willing to forego its own democratic values, playing directly into the strategy of 
Islamic terrorist organizations by isolating the United States from its allies and furthering 
the ethnic divide, both within and outside the United States.  This provides Islamic 
terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda leverage in advancing its own recruiting 
propaganda.  These reasons suggest that profiling is counterproductive. 
A growing trend in Al-Qaeda recruiting practices highlights an unsettling finding: 
not all jihadists are originally from Arab nations, and several are from the United States.  
The findings of an in-depth analysis of 12 of the plots support this assertion.  This trend 
suggests that physical appearances are not constant.  Islamic terrorists can come in any 
skin color and appearance, and are more than likely to use that heterogeneity to avoid 
attracting attention from authorities.  Moreover, this trend highlights that ethnicity and 
national origins are not fixed indicators of the Islamic terrorist.  More Americans of 
Caucasian and Latino backgrounds are reaching out to groups like Al-Qaeda to 
participate in their violent reprisals.  As this trend continues to develop, law enforcement 
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and intelligence communities will have to rely more and more on investigative techniques 
such as social networking models, crime-mapping, and other facets of intelligence-led 
policing.  It appears likely that their investigations will continue to pinpoint non-Arab 
Muslim converts that have decided to resort to violence to defend their new identities.  
While the previous chapter highlighted the extensive efforts of our nation’s law 
enforcement and intelligence communities to build the capacity to prevent terrorism, this 
chapter illustrates that the newly-implemented tools of CT must be used with discretion 
to avoid the pitfalls of a technique such as ethnic profiling.  It appears that much of the 
debate on profiling Muslims is divided along two opposite philosophical lines.  Much of 
our nation’s experience with racial profiling tells us that race is not a good indicator for 
preventing crime, especially when it is used in an impulsive and arbitrary manner.  The 
social costs of such a technique are simply too great to justify its use.  Moreover, the 
nature of identity as it pertains to assimilation and integration, coupled with the 
objectives of Islamic terrorism, tells us that profiling individuals of Muslim identity is 
counterproductive, i.e., the technique actually works against an effective CT-strategy.   
After the attacks on 9/11, it appears that many believed that a technique such as 
profiling could keep Americans safe from another attack by Islamic extremists.  Most of 
the opponents of such a view argue that profiling is constitutionally unlawful and 
contrary to basic democratic principles.  Good policing techniques tell us that race and 
ethnicity will be used, to some degree, when the threat is more narrowly defined.  For this 
reason, it might seem that to some extent, profiling Muslims is a pragmatic response to 
the threat.  I have illustrated, however, that such a technique is counterproductive to 
effective CT-operations because it further alienates an entire community, hindering 
integration and assimilation.  In essence, profiling divides and isolates the United States.  
As a consequence, the grand objective of Islamic extremist organizations is partly 
successful, even without those organizations ever having to successfully commit another 
attack on U.S. soil.  
There is little doubt that Islamic terrorists continue to plan and plot against the 
United States and its interests.  The evidence is apparent around the globe.  While there 
have been several foiled plots of terrorism intended to target innocent Americans, it 
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appears that ethnic profiling was not used by law enforcement in disrupting those plots.  
Nevertheless, many in the Muslim community feel that they are secretly being spied on 
by both the law enforcement and intelligence communities, and the perception that they 
are being profiled still exists, thus the unintended consequences continue to spread. 
In the next chapter, I examine the perspective of actual law enforcement officers 
and explore the extent to which these officers use race, ethnicity, and religion as factors 
in their rationale for probable cause.  I do this by conducting an exploratory survey of 29 
law enforcement officers, the large majority of whom have over 20 years’ experience in 
law enforcement and actively participate in CT-operations.  This chapter will highlight 
the visual and behavioral indicators that these officers use in their rationale for probable 
cause, and illustrate some of the gaps in training that could potentially be addressed by 
more in-depth studies in the future. 
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V. PROFILING METHODOLOGIES: LAW ENFORCEMENT 
“PROFILING” TECHNIQUES 
A major study of racial, ethnic, or religious profiling is challenging for many 
reasons.  The debate is divided along philosophical lines that seem unmovable.  The use 
of profiling in law enforcement—either real or perceived—is often framed in a manner 
that paints a very negative view of law enforcement officers.  The reaction by law 
enforcement is often very defensive.  Whether profiling is real or whether it is a myth, as 
scholars like Heather MacDonald and Michelle Malkin suggest, the I-95 case does 
suggest that race is not a good indicator in preventing crime.  Law enforcement methods 
such as intelligence-led policing provide a logical and systematic approach to tracking 
and mapping crime trends, which allows law enforcement agencies the ability to zero-in 
and prioritize patterns crime in a manner consistent with their level of resources.  Such 
methods are now being applied to drug and gang enforcement all over the country.  
Moreover, such methods have become the cornerstone in CT-operations, making every 
police officer with a radio or patrol-car computer an integral part of a national network of 
CT-police. 
In this chapter, I focus on law enforcement’s methods of identifying visual and 
behavioral indicators that may seem as indicators of crime, including terrorism.  I do this 
by conducting an exploratory survey of actual law enforcement officers.  First, I explain 
the method I used in conducting an exploratory survey of law enforcement officers.  I 
then highlight four major findings that explain the visual and behavioral indicators they 
use in identifying suspicious behavior or building rationale for probable cause.  These 
findings will highlight the specific visual and behavioral indicators, including race, 
ethnicity, and religion, that law enforcement officers, many of whom are now or have 
been active participants in CT-operations, use in identifying suspicious behavior and 
building rationale for probable cause.  This contributes to my thesis by illustrating that 
law enforcement officers understand that factors such as race, ethnicity, and religion are 
poor indicators of crime.  They use dozens of different indicators together in their 
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rationale for reasonable suspicion and probable cause, and generally agree that race, 
ethnicity and religion should never be the sole factor in initiating police action.  
A. EXPLORATORY SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
The exploratory survey uses a very simple approach.  The survey is composed of 
twelve questions, several of which are open ended to allow the respondent to freely write 
his or her responses.  To protect the integrity of the survey, close discretion was used in 
sending invitations to participate in the survey.203  The main goal of the survey was to 
obtain responses from a variety of law enforcement officers (LEOs), i.e., LEOs from 
local, state, and federal agencies.  The initial goal was to obtain responses from at least 
ten LEOs.  In all, a total of 27 LEOs representing local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies participated in the study.  All survey participants are cited as 
anonymous for two reasons: to facilitate a research environment that facilitates open 
responses, and to protect the identity of the law enforcement officers that were willing to 
participate in my research study.  I did not collect detailed information as to the specific 
jurisdiction or area that the participants currently work.  The only identifiable questions 
that I asked are what type of law enforcement they are in, i.e., state, local, federal, etc.; 
how many years’ experience they have; and if they are now or have ever been involved 
with CT-operations.  This ensures that the LEO’s identity is protected while also 
providing a means to filter answers in order to better describe the results.  
This survey is intended to explore the different factors that law enforcement 
officers use in their rationale behind reasonable suspicion and probable cause.  The data 
presented in this chapter is intended to satisfy four objectives: 
(1) Identify the extent that LEOs use race, ethnicity, and religion in their 
rationale for probable cause. 
(2) Identify the various visual and behavioral indicators that LEOs use in their 
rationale for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
                                                 
203 My thanks to Deirdre Walker, the Alumni Network Coordinator for the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School for her assistance in selecting law enforcement 
officers to participate in the survey.  My thanks also to several of the graduates in the alumni network of the 
FBI National Academy for their assistance in selecting law enforcement officers to participate in the 
survey. 
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(3) Assess the extent and quality of the training that LEOs receive in 
identifying visual and behavioral indicators used in their rationale for 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  
(4) Assess the extent and quality of the training that LEOs receive in issues 
surrounding racial profiling. 
The next section will present a summary of the major findings from the survey by 
presenting the questions along with the participants’ responses.  Complete data is 
available for further query and investigation in Appendix B. 
B. MAJOR FINDINGS 
The combined law enforcement experience of the respondents is vast.  The survey 
respondents were primarily local LEOs, with 67% of the participants identifying 
themselves as either local, municipal or city LEOs.  The respondents who identified 
themselves as such have all had long careers: Sixteen of the 19 participants have 20 years 
of law enforcement experience or greater, the remaining three have between 15 and 19 
years of experience.  All but one of the participants who identified themselves as 
members of state law enforcement agencies also have 20 years of law enforcement 
experience or greater.  In all, 28% of the total respondents have over 30 years of law 
enforcement experience, while just one respondent has less than ten years’ experience. 
1. The Extent that LEOs Use Race, Ethnicity, and Religion in Their 
Rationale for Probable Cause 
The large majority of LEOs who participated in the study indicated that race, 
ethnicity and religion are not appropriate indicators in building a rationale for PC.  Some 
of the respondents indicated that race, ethnicity, or religion might play a small role in PC 
when there is either a pre-given description of the suspect, or when they are coupled with 
several other indicators.  As many as 17% of the participants indicated that race, 
ethnicity, or religion will at least be a small part of a rationale for PC.  In one case, it is 
somewhat apparent that LEOs may still be making a categorical association to attacks on 
9/11.  As such, further field research is required to determine the extent that the memory 
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of 9/11 and the subsequent categorization of the threat, i.e., cognitive bias, plays a role in 
a LEO’s rationale for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
2. The Various Visual and Behavioral Indicators that LEOs Use in Their 
Rationale for Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause 
Respondents associated with CT-investigations or operations listed dozens of 
visual and behavioral indicators that they use in their rationale for reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause.  None of the indicators had any association to race, ethnicity, or 
religion, but instead included factors such as nervousness, avoidance, demeanor, furtive 
behavior, sweating, how they act when police approach, lack of eye contact, physical 
symptoms of unlawful drug use such as odor and red eyes, contradictory explanations and 
stories, and suspicious paperwork.  The most common answers among all the participants 
regardless of their experience with CT-investigations or operations includes factors such 
as nervousness, shaking, sweating, inconsistent stories, lack of eye contact, and 
avoidance.  Finally, several officers indicated that taking photographs in a manner 
consistent with surveillance is an indicator of suspicious behavior, this is particularly 
consistent with the warning signs that an individual might be engaged in planning a 
terrorist attack. 
3. The Extent and Quality of the Training that LEOs Receive in 
Identifying Visual and Behavioral Indicators for Reasonable 
Suspicion  
Nearly 90% of the participants learned how to identify visual and behavioral 
indicators through on the job training, while 85% indicated that they had received formal 
classroom training and 85% indicated that they picked it up as they became more 
experienced.  A quarter of the respondents indicated that it was expected of them that 
they already know the different indicators, i.e., that it was common sense.  Many of the 
LEOs indicated that they engage in some type of extracurricular study to train and refresh 
themselves in identifying suspicious visual indicators, including self-study on the issues 
surrounding racial profiling and the kinds of factors that constitute legitimate indicators.  
The data also suggests that initial training on visual and behavioral indicators of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause is minimal, and that refresher training is also 
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minimal.  This finding highlights that more field research is required to determine the 
training gaps in departments throughout the nation.  A broad randomized field study of 
individual police departments at the local, state and federal levels might highlight 
whether lack of initial or refresher training is a problem in agencies nationwide, or if it 
isolated to just a few law enforcement agencies. 
4. LEOs Training on Issues Surrounding Racial Profiling 
The data on the extent and quality of training on the issues surrounding racial 
profiling suggests that a vast majority of the LEOs have received some type of 
specialized training on racial profiling, while a small minority received no training, and 
an even smaller minority indicating that no additional training is needed.  Finally, the 
open-ended responses on when the line is crossed when it comes to racial profiling 
illustrate that that LEOs generally agree that race should not be the primary indicator in 
developing PC and that the line is crossed whenever race is the primary motivator, i.e., all 
other factors are excluded in the rationale for reasonable suspicion or probable cause, or 
when race is the only factor used in the decision to take police action. 
C. CONCLUSION 
As indicated in the Maryland I-95 case study, when law enforcement has a 
narrowly-defined mission set, such as a crackdown on the trafficking and distribution of 
illicit drugs, they may have a detailed analysis of the threat.  Such analyses might include 
the criminal groups that are predominantly responsible for the trafficking and distribution 
of drugs.  Often times, as in the case of many gangs, these criminal groups will be 
composed of specific race and ethnicities.  MS-13 and Latin Kings, the gangs largely 
responsible for the importation and trafficking of drugs in Maryland, are made up only of 
Hispanics and South Americans, while the Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs), such as 
Pagans, also responsible for drug trafficking and sales, requires that an individual be 
white to be a member, while the Thunderguards, another OMG, are all black.  Does this 
mean that Hispanics, or all whites or blacks on motorcycles should be targeted?  The 
answer is, probably not, but for different reasons than the reasons all Muslims should not 
be targeted in operations focused on cracking down on the threat of Islamic terrorism.  
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Nevertheless, knowing which criminal groups are predominantly responsible for the 
crime in question, including terrorism, suggests that race and ethnicity, and even religion, 
would be used—to some degree—in preventing the crime or crimes in question. 
My exploratory research of visual and behavioral indicators, including the extent 
that race, ethnicity, and religion play a role, provides some interesting findings.  There is 
only one instance where it appears that LEOs are categorizing the attacks of 9/11 in a 
manner that might be construed as cognitive bias.  By and large, however, the 
participants agreed that race, ethnicity and religion are not appropriate factors in a 
rationale for probable cause.   The survey data also suggests that LEOs receive formal 
training on the issues surrounding racial profiling, and that they consider that training to 
be adequate.  Many of the officers, however, feel that more training is needed on the 
visual and behavioral indicators used in reasonable suspicion and probable cause.  In 
sum, the participants agreed that race should never be the primary factor in PC, nor 




A. FINDINGS OF THE IMPACTS OF RACIAL, ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS 
PROFILING IN CRIMINAL POLICING, INCLUDING TERRORISM 
Today, the main emphasis of the debate on ethnic and religious profiling 
continues to revolve around the legality and morality of such a technique.  The aim of 
this thesis was to take a fresh perspective on the debate of profiling in CT-operations and 
attempt to determine if profiling is an effective technique in a CT-strategy. 
To discover whether or not profiling works in CT-operations, I conducted a case 
study of racial profiling in law enforcement to determine if it was effective in preventing 
crime.  The results of the case study suggested the following conclusions:   
(1) Greater quantities of drugs, if not most, were found in just a handful of 
searches on black motorists indicating that the targeting of black motorists 
on I-95 was successful in finding drug dealers. 
(2) While MSP has defended its practices under the argument that their tactics 
have led to the arrest of a handful of dealers, a very high number of black 
motorists were targeted, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to yield 
those results.  The resulting social consequences of the perceived targeting 
of black motorists were extremely high, exacerbating racial tensions and 
provoking lasting negative impacts on law enforcement-community 
relations. 
(3) There is no evidence to support or deny the claim that if MSP had pulled 
over and searched the same number of white motorists, that they would 
not have found a large amount of drugs or a handful of drug dealers. 
(4) Race is not a good indicator when relied on too heavily in preventing 
crime as black and white motorists are practically equal in hit rates; that is, 
they are just as likely to be found with some drugs. 
These findings provide useful insight into determining whether ethnic profiling of 
Muslims can have any impact in preventing terrorism.   
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Chapter III provides recent historical background for the issue of profiling.  Since 
the scope of the thesis is to examine the counterproductive nature of profiling in the 
context of CT-operations, it is necessary to explain the transformation of CT-operations 
in the post-9/11 era of homeland security. Counterterrorism is currently done by every 
police officer with a radio and patrol-car computer.  Law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies have an advanced network of information sharing that is used to track patterns 
of crime and cross-reference such trends with massive databases of known and suspected 
terrorists.  The end result is that every police officer on the street is now on the front lines 
of disrupting terrorist attacks and finding those individuals that might be actively plotting 
to commit mass murder. 
In Chapter IV, I illustrate that racial, ethnic, or religious profiling does not appear 
to have played any role in the actual disruption of terrorist plots.  Given the I-95 case 
study that found profiling to be a successful technique in finding drug dealers, one might 
assume similar outcomes for profiling Muslims in CT-operations.  This chapter 
demonstrates, however, that the social costs of profiling Muslims is extremely high and 
that the technique is more than likely counterproductive because it will actually work 
against an effective long-term CT-strategy.   
In light of the larger context of terrorism, including the issues of identity, 
assimilation and integration, profiling of Muslims can negate counter-terrorism efforts in 
the long-term. This occurs for two reasons: first, ethnic profiling exacerbates the identity 
gaps between Muslim and non-Muslim, alienating the former and making the condition 
of social and political detachment more of a likelihood; second, ethnic profiling actually 
portrays the U.S. as fundamentally racist and willing to forego its own democratic values, 
playing directly into the strategy of Islamic terrorist organizations by isolating the United 
States from its allies and furthering ethnic divides both within and outside the United 
States.  This provides Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda leverage in 
advancing its own recruiting propaganda. These reasons suggest that profiling is 
counterproductive. 
The trend that not all Islamic jihadists are of Arab descent suggests that physical 
appearances, ethnicity and national origins indicators of an Islamic terrorist are not fixed.  
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More Americans of Caucasian and Latino backgrounds are reaching out to groups like 
Al-Qaeda to participate in their violent reprisals.  As this trend continues to develop, law 
enforcement and intelligence communities will have to rely more and more on 
investigative techniques such as social networking models, crime-mapping, and other 
facets of intelligence-led policing.  It appears likely that their investigations will continue 
to pinpoint non-Arab Muslim converts that have decided to resort to violence. Thus, 
focusing on one race or ethnicity could lead an officer to miss someone of a different  
ethnicity that may be plotting an attack.  This suggests that other visual and behavioral 
indicators will need to be relied upon more heavily than race or ethnicity.  
Chapter V highlights several important findings pertaining to this thesis. I 
conducted an exploratory survey of law enforcement officers in order to attempt to 
identify the specific visual and behavioral indicators that they use in identifying 
suspicious behavior and building rationale for probable cause.  I found, first, that the 
large majority of law enforcement officers (LEOs) that participated in the study indicated 
that race, ethnicity, and religion are inappropriate indicators in building a rationale for 
probable cause (PC).  Some of the respondents indicated that race, ethnicity, or religion 
might play a small role in PC when there is either a pre-given description of the suspect, 
or when they are coupled with several other indicators.  In one case, it is somewhat 
apparent that LEOs may still be making a categorical association to attacks on 9/11.  As 
such, further field research is required to determine the extent that the memory of 9/11 
and the subsequent categorization of the threat, i.e., cognitive bias, plays a role in a 
LEO’s rationale for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
The second major finding is that LEOs use dozens of visual and behavioral 
indicators in their rationale for reasonable suspicion and probable cause.  None of the 
indicators have any association to race, ethnicity, or religion.  The most common answers 
among all the participants regardless of their experience with CT-investigations or 
operations includes factors such as nervousness, shaking, sweating, inconsistent stories, 




photographs in a manner consistent with surveillance is an indicator of suspicious 
behavior, this is particularly consistent with the warning signs that an individual might be 
engaged in planning a terrorist attack. 
The third important finding is that while between 85–90% of the participants 
learned how to identify visual and behavioral indicators through on-the-job training and 
formal classroom training, a quarter of the respondents indicated that it was expected of 
them that they already know the different indicators, i.e., that it was common sense.  
Many of the LEOs indicated that they engage in some type of extracurricular study to 
train and refresh themselves in identifying suspicious visual indicators, including self-
study on the issues surrounding racial profiling and the kinds of factors that constitute 
legitimate indicators.  The data also suggests that initial training on visual and behavioral 
indicators of reasonable suspicion or probable cause is minimal, and that refresher 
training is also minimal.  This finding highlights that more field research is required to 
determine the training gaps in departments throughout the nation.  A broad randomized 
field study of individual police departments at the local, state and federal levels might 
highlight whether lack of initial or refresher training is a problem in agencies nationwide, 
or if it isolated to just a few law enforcement agencies. 
The fourth and final important finding of this survey is that the data on the extent 
and quality of training on the issues surrounding racial profiling suggests that a vast 
majority of the LEOs have received some type of specialized training on racial profiling, 
while a small minority received no training, and an even smaller minority indicating that 
no additional training is needed.  Finally, the open-ended responses on when the line is 
crossed when it comes to racial profiling illustrate that that LEOs generally agree that 
race should not be the primary indicator in developing PC and that the line is crossed 
whenever race is the primary motivator, i.e., all other factors are excluded in the rationale 
for reasonable suspicion or probable cause, or when race is the only factor used in the 
decision to take police action. 
 95
B. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR POLICY AND DECISION 
MAKERS 
Policymakers should continue to strive for an open dialogue between the political 
representatives and the constituencies that they represent, especially in constituencies 
with large Muslim populations.  This will help ensure that problems are dealt with as 
soon as they begin to develop vice letting them manifest and resurface later in dangerous 
forms.  This is based on the “broken windows” theory.204  It will also prevent what was 
seen in Europe, large exclusive colonies of Muslims that are, for all intents and purposes, 
separate and unequal members of the U.S. society. 
The United States, in some respects, has made headway with regard to including 
expatriate minorities in the political process.  Members of the mixed-Arab diaspora living 
in Dearborn, Michigan are undoubtedly still struggling with identity conflicts.205  
Nevertheless, institutions and councils, to include institutions of higher education such as 
the programs dedicated to Arab and Muslim relations at the University of Michigan in 
Dearborn, provide representation to members of diasporas representing nearly every 
country in the Middle East living in Dearborn, Michigan.  Though members of these 
diasporas that are followers of the Christian faith have accepted a greater extent of 
assimilation in the U.S.,206 these institutions provide opportunities for better integration 
in the host communities by providing mechanisms for social engagement, political 
participation and representation and access to education opportunities. 
                                                 
204 Wilson & Kelling's 'Broken Windows' theory “posits that something as simple as a building with a 
broken window signals abandonment, a lax attitude toward property, and therefore an absence of respect 
for the law. The "broken window" is the first step in a neighborhood's slow decline and deterioration. Over 
time, that decline gets progressively worse. Panhandling, prostitution, drug dealing - all become part of the 
regular activities in front of the building which then spreads out into the neighborhood. People who live in 
the area start to feel vulnerable and begin to withdraw. They become less willing to intervene to maintain 
public order and crime becomes rampant and seemingly out of control.”  See Joan Adams. “The Broken 
Windows Theory,” Supply House Times. Troy: July 2006. Vol. 49, No. 5,  26–27. 
205 Marwa Shoeb, Harvey M. Weinstein, and Jodi Halpern, “Living in Religious Time and Space: 
Iraqi Refugees in Dearborn, Michigan.” Journal of Refugee Studies 20, no.3 (2007). 
206 Ibid. 
 96
1. Judging Quantitative Data 
Caution must be employed when judging statistical disparities in racial, ethnic, or 
religious data in measuring the success of profiling.  Statistical disparities might not be 
accompanied by accurate analyses regarding the meaning of the disparate numbers in 
racial data.  This paper demonstrates this claim.  The Interstate-95 racial profiling data 
indicates that both white and black motorists are just as likely to be found with drugs.  
However, the data emphasizes that black motorists were searched more often in order to 
support a claim that law enforcement officers are unlawfully targeting a particular 
minority race.  An in-depth study of the data for the purpose of determining the 
effectiveness of relying on race as an indicator in preventing crime illustrates both the 
costs and benefits of such a technique, which allows analysts to get a better sense of the 
utility or disutility in using profiling as part of an overall disruption strategy. 
The pitfalls of statistics are also such that they can sometimes upstage more 
effective law enforcement efforts in dealing with crime surges in minority areas.  For 
example, in a hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and 
Human Rights regarding the “The End Racial Profiling Act of 2001,” Steve Young, the 
National Vice President of the Fraternal Order of Police made the following statement: 
Consider the case of the Arlington County Virginia Police Department, 
which responded to demands from the black community to step up 
enforcement against drug dealers in minority neighborhoods.  The police 
instituted aggressive motor-vehicle checks, revived the use of ‘jump out’ 
squads and cracked down on quality-of-life offenses in an effort to make 
dealers uncomfortable in the neighborhood.  By the end of summer 
[2001], it was clear the new enforcement strategy had worked, earning the 
police deserved praise from the community as a whole…this is good 
police work—not racism.207 
As Young suggests, the statistical data will show a “disproportionate” number of 
minority arrests in this area during that time.  Nevertheless, the tactics produced positive 
                                                 
207 United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on the Constitution, 
Federalism, and Property Rights, S. 989, the End Racial Profiling Act of 2002 : Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, August 1, 2001 (Washington: U.S. 
G.P.O, 2002), 35. 
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results because they had the complete support of the impacted community.  Similarly, a 
bottom-up approach in counterterrorist policing is worthy of exploration.  Again, should 
the Arab or Muslim communities reach out to law enforcement to step up their efforts to 
block the influx of radical propaganda that is targeting the youth susceptible to their 
message, the results could be just as positive as that which were seen by Arlington 
County Police and the community that they worked to protect.  Meanwhile, the aperture 
for recruitment remains wide open. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
More field research is required to determine how police officers are being trained 
in identifying visual and behavioral indicators of crime, and to determine the extent that 
the memory of 9/11 and the subsequent categorization of the threat, i.e., cognitive bias, 
plays a role in a LEO’s rationale for reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  Nearly 25% 
of the respondents of my exploratory study indicated that it was expected that the visual 
and behavioral indicators are simply common sense and that they should know it already.  
In all, more respondents stated that the training was poor and needs improvement.  These 
findings suggest that law enforcement officers need better training in identifying visual 
and behavioral indicators.   A more in-depth field study of the manner in which training 
on visual and behavioral indicators is administered will likely identify shortfalls in 
training that if addressed properly, might have present positive improvements on the 
effectiveness of law enforcement officers to see beyond race, ethnicity and religion.  
Similarly, an in-depth field study of cognitive bias in law enforcement officers, 
particularly pertaining to the association to 9/11, might help identify if cognitive bias is 
actually playing a role in a LEO’s rationale for reasonable suspicion or probable cause, 
which might help identify additional training methods on visual and behavioral 
indicators. 
D. FINAL WORDS 
Much of U.S. society’s unwillingness to concede certain civil liberties for the sake 
of security is based on the preservation of our nation’s founding principles and values.  
For some, however, the argument is based simply on inconvenience or paranoia.  
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Moreover, the profiling debate seems to philosophically divide Americans into two 
camps.  The debate has become permeated with loaded language and accusations.  Those 
who call for the use of profiling in CT-operations might understand too little about the 
consequences such a technique will have on assimilation and integration, and 
underestimate the cleverness of Islamic extremist organizations that are attempting to 
isolate and divide the United States, both internally and externally.  Those who do not 
advocate profiling because of the classic civil liberties debate fail to understand that 
Islamic extremist organizations are civil liberties opportunists: they leverage their 
recruiting tactics and propaganda off of  the seemingly good intentions of organizations 
such as the ACLU.  When one considers issues such as identity, and assimilation and 
integration, than perhaps it is more clear that when it comes to preventing terrorism, 
profiling Muslims is more than likely counterproductive to an effective CT-strategy and 
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208 Gross and Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 695. 
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B. SURVEY DATA OF VISUAL AND BEHAVIORAL “PROFILING” 
INDICATORS USED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
Questions One and Two: (1) What Area, or Type, of Law Enforcement are You In?  (2) 
How Many Years of Law Enforcement Experience do You Have? 
 
Participant # Area of LE Years Experience
1 Local law enforcement 30
2 State 35
3 State Law Enforcement Agency 28
4 State Police 27 Years
5 Municipal 30
6 Local 30
7 Local Major City 20
8 Mid Atlantic region- local agency 24
9 Retired local law enforcement, current Federal civilian 30
10 municipal law enforcement agency in NY metro area 34
11 Criminal Investigations local 32 years
12 State Police 22
13 Municipal law enforcement in a an Urban area 16
14 Municipal City 16
15 Municipal (Local) 20
16 Municipal 23
17 Metropolitan 19 years
18 municipal 25
19 Municipal 26
20 Homeland Security - Patrol Operations 20
21 State 15
22 Sheriff's Department 34
23 Federal Bureau of Investigation 33  (26 FBI, 7 LAPD) 
24 
US Border Patrol, I have worked at interior and 
checkpoint stations 7
25 Local Sheriff's Office 25
26 Municipal 25
27 city police, administration 30






Question Three: Are You Now, or Have You Ever Been, Affiliated with 







































Questions Four and Six (Summarized): Based on Your Experience and Training, Can 
You Briefly Describe 5 to 7 Different Visual and Behavioral Indicators that You Might 
Use in Your Rationale for Probable Cause? 




(4) Furtive behavior; 
(5) Sweating; 
(6) How they act when police approach; 
(7) Lack of eye contact; 
(8) Physical symptoms of unlawful drug use such as odor and red eyes; 
(9) Contradictory explanations/stories and suspicious paperwork. 
 
 
Question Five: Considering the Indicators that You Listed, Including the Indicators that 
You Did Not List, Please Indicate the Extent that You Believe Race, Ethnicity, or 
Religion Play a Role in Your Rationale for Probable Cause 
 
Considering the indicators that you listed above, including the indicators that you did not 
list, please indicate the extent that you believe race, ethnicity, or religion play a role in 




























Race 16 5 3 1 1 1 0 27 
Ethnicity 15 4 4 2 1 1 0 27 
Religion 19 2 3 1 1 1 0 27 
Additional Comments 15 
answered question 27




When asked about the extent that race, ethnicity, and religion play a role in their 
rationale for probable cause, each participant had the option of adding including an open-
ended response as additional comments.   
Most frequent responses: 
(1) “Based on counter terror investigations, the separation of visual and 
behavioral indicators is misleading, as there are very few auditory or 
tactile probable cause factors, they are almost always visual, even if it is a 
visual review of material.” 
(2) “I would never admit to using these as a factor.” 
(3) “The factors listed above are factors that should play only a very small 
part if any in establishing probable cause.  I try not to use these factors in 
determining probable cause as they may become an issue in court.” 
(4) “While not an aspect of PC, they can be combined with PC to make 
stronger indicators. They can and sometimes are used as confirmation 
factors in certain areas, but they are not PC and are not used as a primary 
source of PC.” 
(5) “Only if it is related to known crime information and can be used to help 
identify a suspect whose known or suspected information is race, ethnicity 
or religion.” 
(6) “Race, ethnicity, and religion cannot be cited as reason establishing 
probable cause exists in any legal affidavit” 
(7) “I used to work at a station that had a busy checkpoint where 90% of the 
people passing through were Hispanics.  Simple racial profiling of 
Hispanics would have been completely ineffective and would have been 
an incredibly stupid practice.” 
(8) “Above would become a factor if not normal for area or am focused on a 
particular subject/gang.” 
(9) “I would never use any of those three indicators as an articulable [sic] fact 
to establish probable cause for an arrest or detention.”   







Question Seven: How Would You Rate the Level of Training that Law Enforcement 
Officers in Your Field Receive in Identifying the Visual and Behavioral Indicators that 
You Listed? 
 
Participant # Response 
1 Training is adequate, but could use some improvement 
2 Training is adequate, but could use some improvement 
3 Training is poor 
4 Training is poor 
5 Training is poor 
6 Training is very thorough 
7 Training is adequate, but could use some improvement 
8 Training is very thorough 
9 Other (please specify) 
10 Other (please specify) 
11 Training is adequate, but could use some improvement 
12 Training is very thorough 
13 Training is sufficient 
14 Other (please specify) 
15 Training is adequate, but could use some improvement 
16 We do not receive training but need training 
17 Training is sufficient 
18 Training is sufficient 
19 Training is sufficient 
20 Training is sufficient 
21 Training is poor 
22 Training is adequate, but could use some improvement 
23 Training is sufficient 
24 Training is poor 
25 Training is adequate, but could use some improvement 
26 Training is poor 
27 Training is poor 












Question Eight: How Would You Rate the Level of Training that Law Enforcement 
Officers in Your Field Receive in Identifying the Visual and Behavioral Indicators that 
You Listed? 
 
Please select all that apply.  Please indicate the manner in which you 
receive training in identifying the indicators you listed. 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
On the job training 92.6% 25 
Formal training, i.e., classroom instruction 85.2% 23 
Picked it up as you became more experienced 85.2% 23 
Learn by mistake, i.e., trial by fire 48.1% 13 
Expected that you already know it, i.e., it's common 
sense 25.9% 7 
Other (please specify) 22.2% 6 
answered question 27
Table 11.   Quality of Training in Identifying Visual and Behavioral Indicators 
 
 
Question Nine: Have You Ever Received Special Training on the Issues Surrounding 
Racial Profiling? 
 
Have you ever received special training on the issues surrounding racial 
profiling? 
Answer Options Response Percent 
Response 
Count 
Yes 92.6% 25 
No 7.4% 2 











Question Ten: If Answered "Yes" to the Previous Question, How Would You Rate the 








































Question Eleven: Do you Believe that Law Enforcement Officers Need More Specialized 







































Question Twelve: Have You Ever Received Special Training on the Issues Surrounding 
Racial Profiling? 
 
The final question asked of the participants was an open-ended question.  Participants 
were asked to state at what point they believe an officer has “crossed the line” when it 
comes to racial profiling.   
 
The responses include:  
(1) When LEO's cannot provide other predictors and use race, religion or 
association only. 
(2) When a person is stopped because of their race, without other articulible 
[sic] circumstances. 
(3) Race should never be used as a factor when taking police action 
(4) When he or she uses race as the only determining factor to search or detain 
a subject 
(5) When race becomes the predominant or only factor, then this is across the 
line.  Also, if the profile becomes intransigent (additional facts do not 
dissuade), then again we are across the line.  
(6) I disagree with the premise that it should ever be relied on, other than as a 
descriptor of known suspect (s), i.e., you have crossed the line when race 
is used as the basis for your exercise of law enforcement authority or 
discretion. 
(7) If an officer stopped a person solely on their race.  
(8) The line is crossed when negative or otherwise coercive outcomes occur 
simply because of negative perceptions of a characteristic (like race, 
ethnicity, gender, gender identification, etc.) of the individual by an 
officer, as opposed to an assessment of the actions and/or behavior of the 
individual.  The real problem is that discrimination can be so very 




specific awareness of internal biases is a critical component to generating 
greater awareness of issues associated with profiling, or more generally, 
discriminatory policing. 
(9) Any reliance on race other than as its use as a suspect description at the 
same level as gender, height, weight, hair color, eye color, descriptive 
indicators such as tattoos, or other description of a specific suspect 
associated with a specific crime. 
(10) We received significant training so that we don't make this judgment error. 
In past years, I have seen people arrested for racial reasons and associating 
that race with crime (e.g., drug dealing). It has been years since I've seen 
this behavior by officers.  However, despite efforts to adequately train 
officers, I don't doubt it is still a problem we all need to work on and 
correct. 
(11) Quite simply if an officer makes a vehicle stop, arrest, or other detention 
simply based upon race then they have "crossed the line" and their actions 
are not justified.  Race is simply a characteristic that can sometimes be 
used to help identify a person bases on preexisting information or 
intelligence regarding a smuggling organization.  The usefulness of race is 
very limited in law enforcement.  Race should never be used as a basis to 
make an arrest, detention, or a vehicle stop. Race is also generally not 
acceptable as an articulable fact in establishing the suspicion needed to 
conduct a stop, search, detention, or arrest.  The only exception that I can 
think of is one race is a part of a specific description used to identify a 
suspect (i.e., you have a description o a suspect who is an Hispanic male, 
5'6", red shirt, tattoo on neck, ponytail, and you detain a person matching 
that description).  In that case the race would be part of the description 
used to identify the person.  Using race or ethnicity as a basis to conduct 
arrests, searches, or detentions is illegal and ineffective. 
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